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Yugoslavia is a federated, multi-national state in which ties 
of ethnicity exert greater hold on its people than do ties of 
political loyalty to the state. However, Yugoslavia’s postwar 
communist regime has partially succeeded in mollifying ethnic 
sensitivities by not eroding their bases. Instead, the ethnic 
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, and Montenegro were created within the political 
body of Yugoslavia and vast jurisdiction has been conceded to the 
republics. Yugoslav politics has been correspondingly shaped by 
a delicate balance of power among the federal units, a balance in 
which the ethnic factor is the primary consideration, no matter 
what the issue may be. As a result, Yugoslavia’s interethnic 
balance serves to focus this study on the behavior, of ethnic 
groups, and whether their political behavior parallels the 
patterns of confrontation and competition which exist between 
nation-states in an international balance of power system.
Yugoslav nationalities policy has been characterized by a 
gradual devolution and decentralization of power from the League 
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to the Communist parties of the 
republics. During the Croatian Crisis (1968-1971), the Croatian 
party leaders led a nationalist movement which called for the 
establishment of Croatia as an independent nation. As the 
ultimate arbiter in Yugoslavia, Tito was instrumental in removing 
rebellious Croatian party leaders from the LCY. During 1970s 
ethnic conflict continued to be a growing problem for the LCY.
The Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared to be a 
national group, and in the autonomous province of Kosovo, 
secessionist and irredentist agitation by the predominantly 
Albanian population was on the rise. In April 1981, Kosova 
exploded in violence and the province was put under a state a 
martial law. Without Tito as a unifying influence, the current 
situation in Yugoslavia is indicative of LCY impotence in the 
face of interethnic conflict in the post-Tito era.
Therefore, the Yugoslav republics have gained sufficient 
autonomy to effect a balance of power arrangement in Yugoslav 
politics, and within the context of Yugoslav Marxism, 
ethnonational forces are the primary determinants of political 
behavior, while economic factors are of secondary consideration.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Balkans have a long history of ethnic, religious, 
and nationalist strife. In particular, the area which after 
World War I became Yugoslavia (The Union of South Slavs) has 
been a historic crossroad for conquest and occupation.
Slavic tribes settled in what is now Yugoslavia during the 
sixth century and ruled themselves until the Ottoman Turks 
began their Balkan expansion in the twelfth century. After 
the collapse of the medieval kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia, 
and Bosnia, the South Slavs were ruled variously by 
Austrians, Hungarians, Italians, and Turks.
The division between the jurisdiction of the Christian 
powers and the empire of the Muslim Turks marked a major 
cultural divide which reinforced the earlier cleavage 
between Catholic and Orthodox South Slavs. By the time the 
South Slavs were brought into a common state in 1918, they 
had become accustomed to thinking of themselves as distinct 
peoples (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Montenegrins). The 
additional presence of certain non-Slavic peoples 
(Hungarians, Albanians, Germans, and Italians), together 
with Slavic Bulgarians and Macedonians, further complicated 
the picture.1 Thus, the nationalities problem became a
1
The Regions of Yugoslavia
Austria
Hungary
Ljubljana
Italy SLOVENIA © Zagreb
RomaniaV O JV O O IN A
C R O ATIA
BO SNIA-
HERCEGQVINA
SERBIA
MONTENEGROJ Pr,*{m« 
J T lto g ra d BulgariaKOSOVO /
Socialist Federal Republic of 
YUGOSLAVIA
M A C E D O N IA
Greece
Republics' Slovenia. Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro. Macedonia 
Autonomous P rcnrces: Vojvodina and Kosovo, both located in the Republic o f Serbia
Source: Reproduced with permission from Drazha Mihailovich 
Memorial Edition (Chicago: The Serbian National Committee, 197$),r m -- 1—
burning issue for the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia and has 
continued to occupy center stage for postwar Yugoslavia.
Because Yugoslavia is a new country, ties of ethnicity 
exert greater hold on its people than do ties of political 
loyalty to the state. The interwar kingdom foundered on its 
misconceived denial of these differences among its Slavic 
peoples— ethnic groups were treated as members of a single 
Yugoslav nation. Yugoslavia's postwar communist regime has 
partially succeeded in mollifying ethnic sensitivities by 
not eroding their bases. Instead, the ethnic republics of 
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were 
created within the political body of Yugoslavia and vast 
jurisdiction has been conceded to the republics. Yugoslav 
politics has been correspondingly shaped by a delicate 
balance of power among the federal units, a balance in which 
the ethnic factor is the primary consideration, no matter 
what the issue may be. As a result, Yugoslavia's inter­
ethnic balance serves to focus this study on the behavior of 
ethnic groups, and whether their political behavior 
parallels the patterns of confrontation and competition 
which exist between nation-states in an international 
balance of power system.
In two cases— Bosnia and Voyvodina— the local 
populations were so heterogeneous that the Communist party 
hesitated to establish them as separate republics.
Voyvodina was therefore established as an autonomous 
province, a unit that, at least initially, had less self-
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governing power than the republics. After some hesitation, 
Bosnia was established as a republic, but its Serbs, Croats, 
and ethnic Muslims (categorized as a distinct national group 
in 1968) were declared to have equal title to the republic. 
In the southern part of Yugoslavia, in a region Hitler had 
granted to Albania and which various Yugoslav resistance 
movements had wrenched back by force, the Yugoslav 
communists established the autonomous region of Kosovo- 
Metohija. This region is juridically a notch below 
Voyvodina, and the population today is predominately 
Albanian.
If the federal units were ethnically homogeneous the 
political landscape would complex enough. But, interethnic 
relations are further complicated by the dispersion of 
nationalities throughout the country, (see Table 1) For 
example, 14 percent of the population of Croatia is 
ethnically Serbian, and 17 percent of the population of 
Macedonia is ethnically Albanian. Serbians in Croatia and 
Albanians in Macedonia have played volatile roles during the 
past fifteen years, inflaming relations among ethnic groups 
and among the federal units. Moreover, some of the 
dispersed ethnic groups have played a role out of proportion 
to their numbers. The Croatian Serbs are overrepresented in 
the Croatian party, police, and militia. Serbs have also 
long played a central role in the governing apparatus of 
Albanian-populated Kosovo.2
TABLE 1.
Population of Yugoslavia by Republic, 1981
Number of inhabitants Percentage of
in thousands largest nationality
YUGOSLAVIA 22,418
Bosnia-Hercegovina 4,128 39.5(a)
Croatia 4,582 75.4
Macedonia 1,921 66.7
Montenegro 585 68.2
Serbia 5,673 85.7
Slovenia 1,887 90.1
Kosovo 1,595 76.9(b)
Voyvodina 2,029 54.6(c)
a = Muslims 
b = Albanians 
c = Serbs
Source: Statistichki kalendar Jugoslavije 1982,
(Belgrade:Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1982), p. 33.
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Despite its federal form, the Yugoslav political system 
was initially a tightly centralized Stalinist model. At the 
Sixth Party Congress in 1952, the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia (CPY) assumed its new name, the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). The new name was a tacit 
admission of the non-unitarian characteristics of 
Yugoslavia's ethnic makeup, and the LCY tentatively began a 
process of decentralization which has so far proven 
distinctive among communist systems.-^ Since 
decentralization, the republics and autonomous provinces 
have increasingly become spokesmen for their titular 
nationalities (except in the cases of Bosnia, Voyvodina, and 
perhaps, Kosovo).
The interrepublican struggles, which have become the 
cornerstone of Yugoslav politics, have been played out on 
four levels: among the republics themselves in areas where 
republics, have exclusive jurisdiction; within the arena of 
the federal center (government and party) on issues in which 
the jurisdiction of the center is pivotal; between groups of 
republics with the federal center taking one side in the 
struggle; and among various factions within the republics, 
with a faction from one republic allying with a kindred 
group in another republic to defeat legislation proposed by 
its antagonists. Major policy departures, such as the 
legitimation of a separate Muslim nationality in 1968, have 
always required the sanction of the center and, often, the 
initiative of factions at the center.^
Unlike the Soviet Union, a federation dominated by the 
Great Russian majority, power in Yugoslavia is somewhat 
evenly dispersed along ethnic lines. Since Serbians 
comprise 40 percent of the population (see Table 2), most 
alliances between republics are anti-Serbian and tend to be 
sensitive to real or imagined Serbian cultural and political 
hegemony. In a country with six republics, two semi- 
autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic (Voyvodina 
and Kosovo), twenty four subnationalities, four major 
languages, and three major religions, fear of possible 
Serbian chauvinism is a consistent feature of Yugoslav 
politics.
President Josip Broz Tito ruled Yugoslavia for more 
than thirty-five years. His death in May 1980 was perceived 
by most Yugoslavs as the end of an era. Some observers 
believed his death would catalyze revolt throughout the 
country and mark the end of Yugoslavia as such. Although 
the transition to post-Tito Yugoslavia has not been without 
controversy, the succession has been accomplished with less 
conflict than was once thought possible.
The 1974 Constitution is Tito's solution for succession 
and LCY infighting. He adopted the Swiss model of a 
collegial presidency and hoped a rotating collective 
leadership would keep Yugoslavia stable and integrated. 
However, this solution has failed to cope with the problems 
of growing nationalism and party decentralization. The new 
Yugoslav constitution granted greater sovereignty to the
TABLE 2.
Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnic Group, 1981
Number Percent
Serbs 8,136,578 36
Croats 4,428,135 19
Muslims 2,000,034 8
Slovenes 1,753,605 7
Albanians 1,731,252 7
Macedonians 1,341,420 6
"Yugoslavs" 1,216,463 5
Montenegrins 577,298 2
Hungarians 426,865 1
Gypsies 148,604 0
Turks 101,328 0
Slovaks 80,300 0
Romanians 54,721 0
Bulgarians ‘ 36,642 0
Vlahs 32,071 0
Ruthenes 23,320 0
Czechs 19,609 0
Italians 15,116 0
Ukrainians 12,809 0
Undeclared 46,716 0
TOTAL 22,418,331
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Source: Statistichki kalendar Jugoslavije 1982,
(Belgrade:Savezni zavod za statistiku,1982), p. 37.
republics and, technically, it even granted the right of 
secession.^ Tito mistakenly surmised that although the 
legal and economic system would be confederated to an 
appreciable degree, the centralizing forces of the LCY would 
buttress the state and the regime.
The collective leadership fashioned by Tito publicly 
proclaimed its determination to follow in Tito's path. But, 
the new leadership proved unable to prevent a loosening of 
the Yugoslav system for two primary reasons. First, without 
Tito, the LCY lacked an ultimate arbiter and was therefore 
tangibly weaker than before. For instance, the Croatian 
republic was on the verge of secession between 1968-1971, 
Tito was instrumental in removing rebellious Croatian party 
leaders from the LCY. Today, Croatia is again a hotbed of 
separatism, and the Catholic Church's role has been compared 
to the role of the Polish Church. The divided party 
leadership cannot assert itself because, in many cases, the 
will of the party cannot be discerned from interrepublican 
conflict over ethnic questions.
Second, the explosion of violence in Kosovo in April 
1981, when discontented Albanians went on a destructive 
rampage and also attacked Serbs, produced a nationalist 
backlash throughout Yugoslavia. The current situation is 
indicative of LCY impotence in the face of interethnic 
conflict in the post-Tito era. Although Kosovo is the 
historic cradle of the Serbian nation, Albanian inmigration 
over the past century has had a marked demographic effect.
The 1974 Constitution has inspired the Albanian majority to 
push for republican status within Yugoslavia. This 
suggestion has met vehement resistance among Serbians within 
the Serbian republic and in Kosovo. As Albanian nationalism 
collides with Serbian outrage over alleged atrocities 
committed by Muslim Albanians against Orthodox Serbs, LCY 
indecision has exacerbated the crisis. While the federal 
government struggles to maintain the status quo, Kosovo 
province remains under a virtual state of martial law. The 
impasse in Kosovo has reopened questions about the utility 
of federalism as a solution for interethnic tensions and 
distrust. Some Yugoslav academicians have suggested 
Yugoslavia has the potential of becoming a second Lebanon.
Therefore, the object of this inquiry is to determine 
if the LCY has lost the capacity to govern and if 
Yugoslavia's present federal system is vulnerable to 
dissolution, or, whether the Yugoslav republics have gained 
sufficient autonomy to evolve into a new political structure 
which resembles an international balance of power system.
In order to interpret contemporary politics in Yugoslavia, 
Yugoslav nationalities policy and three interethnic crises 
during the period from 1968-1987 will be analyzed and 
discussed. In addition, the insights of noted international 
relations theorists (particularly the systems analyses of 
Morton Kaplan)6 will be employed to demonstrate that 
Yugoslavia's domestic political system has acquired many of 
the features of an international balance of power system.
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In the interstate universe, according to Morton Kaplan 
(author of Systems and Process in International Politics), 
only the loose bipolar and balance of power systems have 
actually had historical precedence. The other four systems 
which Kaplan mentions (the tight bipolar, unit-veto, 
universal, and hierarchical systems) are intended as 
analytical constructs.7
But in the intrastate system, five of the six systems 
Kaplan describes have had historical referents— only the 
unit-veto system has not. Austria-Hungary (1867-1918)— with 
separate stamps, currency, parliaments, tax collections, and 
judicial, educational, and transportation systems— is 
perhaps one of the clearest historical examples of a tight 
bipolar system. The Austrian and Hungarian halves of the 
empire regularly clashed over questions of foreign policy 
and engaged in continual rivalry within the state. The 
Soviet Union closely resembles the universal system, 
described by Kaplan as a semi-unified political system under 
a world government, in which a central actor dominates 
peripheral actors enrolled on a formally voluntary basis.
In the Soviet Union, the great Russians dominate a 
multiethnic realm in which the non-Russian republics enjoy 
the formal right of secession. Switzerland figures as 
Kaplan's hierarchical system, in which national actors 
(German, French, and Italian language groups) cease to be 
the primary foci of loyalty and function instead as terri­
torial subdivisions or intermediate levels of organization.8
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Finally, Yugoslavia evolved gradually from a configura­
tion which paralleled a loose bipolar system (1918-1965, a 
system in which two antagonistic national actors are the 
focus of political activity, while other national actors are 
peripheral to the system) to a balance of power system since 
1965 (a system in which the relationships between actors are 
characterized by shifting alliances, and where no one 
national actor is indispensible to the system or can 
dominate the decision-making process).
In order to apply a modified version of Kaplan's 
typology to Yugoslavia, ethnic groups rather than states 
will be designated as actors in the system. In addition, the 
state, rather than a group of states, represents the 
boundaries of the conceptual system. Perhaps, the use of 
bipolar and balance of power models as analytical frameworks 
will help to bring into focus the patterns of Yugoslav 
politics.
'It is the thesis of this study that in a federated 
multi-national state governed by a Marxist-Leninist party, 
the centralizing forces of the party will inevitably succumb 
to the centripetal and fragmentary forces of nationalism and 
interethnic conflict, unless there is one ethnic group which 
comprises a substantial majority within the party and the 
population.\ Therefore, this study also intends to establish 
that, within the context of Yugoslav Marxism, ethnonational 
forces are the primary determinants of political behavior, 
while economic factors are of secondary consideration.!
NOTES
-̂Yugoslavia: A Country Study ed. Richard F. Nyrop 
{Washington D. C.;U. S. Government, Department of the Army, 
1982), pp. 1-28.
3Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National 
Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 
101-43, 184-226; and Michele Lee, "Kosovo Between Yugoslavia 
and Albania," New Left Review 140 (July-August 1983): 88.
3Ibid.
4Dennison I, Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 292.
^Joseph Richard Goldman, "Consociational Authoritarian 
Politics and the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution: A Preliminary 
Note," East European Quarterly 19 (June 1985): 241-49.
^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 21-52.
7Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International 
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 21-52.
®Ibid.
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CHAPTER II 
YUGOSLAV NATIONALITIES POLICY 
Ethnic Perspective and Background
Nationalism is a very real phenomenon in Yugoslavia and 
animates much of social life. Tensions have reached the 
boiling point in nearly every republic in recent years. 
Typically, sporting events provide a ready spark for 
manifestations of ethnic hatred and Serb-Croat competitions 
are frequently marred by outbursts of ethnic slurs and name 
calling. For instance, after a soccer match in the Croatian 
city of Split, young Croats pushed several cars bearing 
Belgrade license plates into the sea. Since Belgrade is not 
only the capital of Yugoslavia but also the capital of the 
Serbian republic, the Croats assumed the cars belonged to 
Serbs.1
In Yugoslavia, not only interregional rivalry but also 
regional opposition against centralized political power 
tends to be expressed and mobilized in ethnic terms.
Regional leaders in Yugoslavia have frequently adopted this 
tactic, even though economic and ethnic interests are not 
always equally well served by the same solutions. Regional 
elites deliberately play the role of national leaders and 
present issues in ethnic terms. Croatian leaders have done 
this vis-a-vis the Serbs, Kosovan-Albanian leaders vis-a-vis
14
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the Serbs, Macedonian party leaders vis-a-vis the Serbs, and 
Serbian leaders vis-a-vis almost everyone else.
But, Yugoslav politics is not simply reducible 
antagonisms between Serb and non-Serb. The Serbs share many 
common interests with the Montenegrins as well with the 
Macedonians, and they have repeatedly courted the Bosnian 
party as a natural ally. It should be noted that 
Montenegrins, Macedonians, and a third of the Bosnians share 
a common religion with the Serbs— Eastern Orthodoxy.^ it 
would not be accurate to leave the impression that non-Serbs 
constitute a camp. Croats have been increasingly worried 
over the steady Slovene infiltration of the northwest corner 
of Croatia's Istrian peninsula, along the border with 
Slovenia. This is at least in part an economic issue, but 
Croatian apprehension is ethnic in source and is voiced in 
ethnic terms.^
Despite the plethora of variations possible in Yugoslav 
interethnic strife, the Serb-Croat rivalry remains the pivot 
of ethnic competition and is viewed by both Serbs and Croats 
in religious terms. The identification of the churches with 
nationalism goes back to the time of the Ottoman occupation, 
when the Orthodox churches were the guardians of national 
culture as well as the political viceroys. In independent 
Montenegro, which successfully resisted the Ottoman Turks 
for five hundred years, the Orthodox Church arrogated the 
role of protector of the nation. At the same time, the
16
Catholic Church in Croatia, which had been absorbed into the 
Habsburg empire, maintained a political role.^
In World War II, the Ustashe (uprising) Croatian- 
fascist government of Ante Pavelich found a ready ally in 
the Catholic Church. During the war, Croatian priests 
played active roles in fomenting and overseeing the 
slaughter of one million Serbs and thousands of Jews and 
Gypsies.5 Even today, communist officials continue to 
complain that Croatianess tends to be identified with 
Catholicism and Serbianness with Orthodoxy. Although 
growing secularization is normally expected in a modernizing 
society, Yugoslavia experienced a waxing xenophobia and a 
rebirth of religious sentiment among the young in the late 
1960s, especially in Croatia.5 The reassertion of religious 
feelings underlines the closeness of the ethnic-religious 
relationship in Yugoslav politics.
Therefore, in mobilization systems like the Leninist 
one-party systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
interregional politics, like every other political aspect, 
cannot be distilled from the ethnic, religious, and 
ideological milieu. This is especially true of interethnic 
and interrepublcian relations, which are framed and 
channeled by an explicit, developed nationalities policy 
based on and derived from the underlying ideological 
presumptions of the system. The very federal arrangement 
which permits the wide degree of autonomy enjoyed by
17
Yugoslavia's republics had first to be justified before it 
could be advanced.
The Yugoslavs maintain they have a nationalities 
policy. This claim suggests they view their multiethnic 
composition as potentially problematic, and political 
involvement in this sphere is considered legitimate. The 
LCY also claims to have resolved the nationalities question. 
This claim can be understood in either of two ways: (1) that 
nationalism, as politicized ethnicity, has been by and large 
eliminated; or (2) that institutionalized patterns of 
cooperation and mutual accommodation have become a stable 
part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist 
excesses to be contained, defused, or even bypassed. The 
first interpretation is the way in which the Yugoslav 
communists themselves understood their claim until the 
Eighth Congress of the LCY (1964). Since then, however, the 
second interpretation has dominated Yugoslav thinking on the 
subject. In other words, the contemporary Yugoslav claim 
amounts to the faith that under Yugoslavia's brand of 
socialism, conditions are created which will make possible a 
future solution for the nationalities problem.7
The admission that a solution for ethnic turmoil is 
still in the future reflects the new candor and modesty 
which have characterized LCY statements on the subject of 
nationalism, especially since the Kosovo riots of 1981. 
However, the LCY still asserts Yugoslavia is on the right 
track and that it has devised a system which gives national
18
groups free rein to advance their separate interests, and 
eventually draw together around a common interest. Thus, 
the Yugoslav communists believe they have constructed a 
model of political organization worthy of emulation.®- It is 
a bold claim, since it carries the implication that only 
under some form of socialism is interethnic harmony 
possible.
Marxism and the National Question
Karl Marx considered the existence of ethnically 
heterogeneous communities as a question to be resolved.
That it was a question had become clear for the Habsburg 
empire, which had suppressed a vigorous Hungarian revolution 
in 1848-1849. Hegel had already outlined a view of history 
in which lower ethnic forms of life gave way to higher forms 
and heterogeneity was expected to melt away before the 
waxing Volksqeist of historical peoples.0 However, for 
Hegel this reduction in heterogeneity was limited to the 
material realm, while the discrete national character and 
consciousness of particular ethnic groups would remain.10 
But, before Marx, few had raised ethnic heterogeneity from 
the level of a policy question a posteriori to a status as a 
question a priori. Marx's formulation of the question at 
once implied and required an answer, a resolution, a correct 
approach. Thus, the LCY's concern and preccupation with the 
national question is in the critical tradition of Marxist 
thought, and a discussion of Marxism and nationalism is
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therefore necessary for a historical perspective on Yugoslav 
nationalities policy.
Marx's approach to multinationality stemmed in part 
from his dialectical view of history, in which each 
historical stage manifests internal contradictions and 
tensions that are resolved at a higher stage, thus 
propelling history forward. Marx also presumed true 
conflict is economically motivated— the corollary being that 
ethnic strife is a sham, a veneer behind which the 
exploitative middle classes can mobilize and manipulate 
their proletarian and peasant populations.
Nationalism, rooted in ethnic prejudice and collective 
consciousness based on a shared language, was linked by Marx 
with the bourgeois-capitalist stage of historical 
development, eventually to be transcended by the passage to 
socialism. In this view, proletarian internationalism is 
not problematic but automatic, even ineluctable. Marx's 
supposition that national differences would dissolve with 
modernization and political and economic unification implies 
that the idea of nation is an expression or form of the 
social organization of the market. It is not necessarily 
obvious that Marx drew from this the inference imputed to 
him by the Soviets— nationalism and internationalism are 
opposed. Rather, Marx seems to have viewed proletarian 
nationalism (or the authentic nationalism of a socialist 
country) and internationalism as being in some sense 
symbiotic. Thus, Marx's insistence that workers have no
20
country was not a boast or a program. It was a protest 
against the exclusion of the proletariat from the privilege 
of full membership in the nation.11 It is worth noting that 
Yugoslav officialdom concurs with this interpretation of 
Marx. The LCY can insist nationality is indeed an important 
factor in the consciousness of the working class, that the 
working class still is national.
If the Yugoslav position seems to lead directly to 
"national communism," which has until recently been treated 
as a rather profligate child by Soviet Marxists, it is 
nevertheless consistent with the tradition in which Marx was 
working.1  ̂ Yet, it is clear from the Communist Manifesto 
that Marx and Engels thought national consciousness and 
nationalism would evaporate as a result of modernization. 
This concept stems from the underlying Marxist assumption 
that a change in behavior will lead to a change in mental 
attitude. Thus, the elimination of conflicts rooted in 
class society will stimulate cooperation across ethnic lines 
and create positive feelings among ethnic groups within the 
system. J
However, it is not obvious Marx and Engels thought the 
world would eventually speak only one language. The current 
universality of English, like the earlier universality of 
Latin, only demonstrates that people of different states 
require some common medium, and it is likely to be the 
language of the dominant power. Although Marx and Engels 
welcomed the subjugation of "less civilized, unhistorical
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peoples" (e.g., Slavs and Blacks) by the more advanced races 
(e.g., Germans and Americans), they stopped short of 
explicitly advocating coercive ethnic assimilation.14
The Austrian Marxists, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, were 
the first Marxists to articulate a political program dealing 
with the creation of harmony in an ethnically diverse state. 
They were inspired in this endeavor by their desire to prop 
up the faltering multinational Habsburg empire. The 
Austrian Marxists designed a centralist scheme with 
concessions to cultural autonomy and guarantees of free use 
of language. Renner described the nation as a spiritual and 
cultural community and emphasized the centrality of language ■ 
in the formation of group consciousness. Bauer underlined 
national character as a social bond and spoke of the nation 
as a collective with a common culture and a shared destiny. 
Bauer's definition not only blurred the distinction between 
state and nation, citizenship and nationality, but also 
implied a minimization of the importance of compact 
territory.
The Austrian Marxists' formulations were closer in 
spirit to Hegelianism than, to Marxism. Their notions of 
nationalism allowed for the intrusion of the semimystic 
concepts of character, culture, consciousness, spiritual 
community, and destiny. Renner and Bauer considered 
nationality to be basically a matter of folk culture and 
language. Therefore, they were content to offer 
reassurances of cultural autonomy, while withholding both
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administrative and political autonomy as potentially 
disintegrative concessions.15
However, Lenin seemed to be less sympathetic to 
nationalism than the Austrian Marxists were. He asserted 
that "both the example of all progressive mankind and the 
example of the Balkans" demonstrated that the national state 
is the rule and norm under capitalism. /"The state of 
diverse composition is something backward or an anomaly."
He believed that for the proletariat, national demands are 
generally subordinate to the interests of the working class; 
for the proletariat it is important "to insure the 
development of its class."16 !
In 1913, Stalin undertook, on Lenin's request, to 
produce an analysis of ethnicity as a political factor. 
Stalin focused his work on a critique of the Austrian 
Marxists. He warned that exclusive stress on national 
character was leading Bauer and Renner away from the real 
essence of nationality, which is a complex phenomenon 
emerging not only on the basis of a shared language, but 
also within a compact territory and within the context of a 
common economic life.
In addition, given the Marxist tenet that modernization 
not only creates a world culture but also results in the 
disintegration of distinct national cultures and the 
evaporation of national antagonisms, Stalin concluded that 
the notion of cultural autonomy, infused with notions of 
preservation of culture, was inherently reactionary. He not
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only considered the concept of cultural autonomy to be 
founded on a seriously flawed analysis of nationality, but 
also deemed it politically nefarious. Stalin's harsh 
treatment of Soviet Georgians, his own ethnic identity, 
underscored his views on nationality.
J  However, Stalin was unable to trumpet centralism, since 
such a policy had unmistakably failed in tsarist Russia, and 
because the liberation of the proletariat could not be 
allowed to restrict the self-determination of any 
nationality . Therefore, Stalin offered as the ideal 
solution a system of regional or territorial autonomy. He 
believed this solution would permit the nationalities to 
enjoy their rights of self-determination and self­
administration without obstructing the drawing together of 
nations which is concomitant with the creation of a unified 
market stimulated by modernization.1  ̂f
Marxism and Federalism
The adaptation of federalism to a Marxist-Leninist 
system posed an ideological hurdle insofar as Marx's 
writings are unmistakably hostile to federalism. Marx and 
Engels believed the interest of the proletariat would be 
better served in a unitary state than in a federal system. 
Marx was convinced decentralization could only serve the 
interests of regional bourgeois elites. He argued 
centralization would create the preconditions for its own 
transcendence— the withering away of the state. In
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opposition to liberal democrats who were backing federation, 
Marx told the Communist League in 1850 that "the workers 
must use their influence not only for the one and 
indivisible German republic, but for a decisive 
centralization of force within it in the hand of the state 
power."1®
Lenin was originally hostile to federalism. He 
believed federalism weakened economic links and was an 
unsuitable model for any state. Stalin echoed these 
sentiments in a March 1917 article entitled Against 
Federalism. Reiterating the Marxist maxims about the 
preferability of centralism, Stalin concluded that 
"federalism in Russia does not and cannot solve the national 
question; ... it merely confuses and complicates it with 
quixotic ambitions to turn back the wheel of history."19 Up 
to the very eve of the October Revolution, Lenin considered 
the right of secession a sufficient guarantee for the 
composite nationalities of the Russian empire. State and 
Revolution, completed shortly before the Bolsheviks came to 
power, represents a turning point in Lenin's views on 
federalism. Although he still asserted federalism was in 
general "a hindrance to development," he insisted federalism 
might represent "a step forward in certain special 
conditions" and "among these special conditions the national 
question appears prominently."^9
Although Soviet federalism was compromised by a refusal 
to extend the principle to the Communist Party of the Soviet
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Union— as enshrined in a resolution of the Eighth Party
Congress (1919) that the central committees of the Ukraine,
Latvia, and Lithuania had no legitimate basis on which to
stake out autonomous realms— it nonetheless quickly became a
01point of doctrine.
In the early years of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
(CPY), the Soviet example was snubbed. It was only in the 
wake of the adoption of the popular front policy at the 
Comintern's Seventh Congress (1935) that the CPY abandoned 
its program of seeking to break up Yugoslavia into small 
national states. After the Congress, the CPY began to move 
in the direction of an endorsement of federalism.22
In conclusion, it is evident that Soviet and Yugoslav 
federalism is not congruent with classical Marxist tenets, 
and is thus revisionist. However, the CPSU and the LCY 
would undoubtedly claim that objective conditions warranted 
a change in approach and federalism was now historically 
correct.
Development of Yugoslavia's Nationalities Policy
From the time of the CPY's founding in 1919 to the 
period immediately preceding World War II, the Yugoslav 
communists reexamined and altered several of their basic 
premises regarding nationalities policy. This period can be 
characterized by three distinct phases: (1) 1919-1923, 
advocacy of centralism and unitarism, buttressed by the 
concept of the tri-named people (Serbs, Croats, and
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Slovenes); (2)1923-1928, internal contention between the 
left and right wings of the party— with the Serbian- 
dominated unitarist right wing opposed to the Croat and 
Slovene controlled federalist left wing; and (3)1928-1934, 
the Comintern phase, marked by submission to the Cominterm 
dictum that Yugoslavia should be broken into separate, 
homogeneous nation-states.2^
After the triumph of the Nazis in Germany in 1934, the 
Comintern undertook a critical reappraisal of its 
nationalities strategy and conceded it had erred. As a 
result of the attempt to prevent the further spread of 
fascism, the CPY determined the national question could be 
resolved within the framework of the Yugoslav state. The 
possibility of a Yugoslav solution necessarily entailed the 
soft-pedaling of a Balkan federation of homogeneous nation­
states. However, the CPY simultaneously resolved to 
establish Communist party organizations for Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Montenegro, although this decision was 
tempered by the continued adherence to the principle of 
party centralization. Secession was still considered a 
right, but it was no longer seen as inherently progressive. 
The danger was all too great that separatism might play into 
the hands of the fascists.24
But, as late as the Fifth National Party Conference 
(November, 1940) in the Croatian capital of Zagreb, the CPY 
shrank from formal endorsement of federalism. It was only 
at its next session at Jajce25 on November 29, 1943, that
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the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of 
Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), in which the CPY was heavily 
represented, promised a federal order for postwar 
Yugoslavia.̂
Despite the agonizing appraisals and reappraisals which 
had punctuated the CPY's torturous groping over the 
nationalities question, the party adopted a relatively bland 
attitude immediately after the war. In 1948, Tito tried to 
convince a skeptical Slovenian audience the national 
question had been settled to the general satisfaction of 
Yugoslavia's peoples. In the post war period, Yugoslav 
communists generally assumed a new socialist nation was in* 
the process of being created.^ The federal system was 
perceived to be an ephemeral formality and relinquished 
little authority to the republics. Yugoslavia's national 
heterogeneity was the sole rationale for the establishment 
of federalism, with each republic except Bosnia-Herzegovina 
named after and consecrated as the official political 
embodiment of a discrete national group. The CPY believed 
the process of homogenization would erode the basis for the 
federal system, and in the ripeness of time, national 
differences would wither away (a prerequisite for the 
withering away of federalism and eventually the state).^®
During the 1950s, "Yugoslav" was touted as an ethnic- 
national classification in its own right, sometimes as a 
supranational category. This Yugoslavianism 
(Juqoslovenstvo) and Brotherhood and Unity (Bratstvo i
jedinstvo) campaign reached its culmination at the Seventh 
Congress of the LCY in 1958.^9 Although the new party 
program denied the intention of assimilating the composite 
groups into a homogeneous Yugoslav nation, the concept of 
"Yugoslav culture" endorsed by the congress implied an 
expectation of homogenization.
The 1961 census introduced the category "Yugoslav" as 
an ethnic alternative. However, only 317,124 persons 
declared themselves to be Yugoslavs rather than Serbs, 
Croats, or any of the other traditional groups. The Croats 
and Slovenes in particular, but also the Muslims and other 
nationalities, felt threatened by the specter of renewed 
Serbian unitarism thought to be lurking under the robes of 
ambiguous Yugoslavianism. They countered the prevailing 
view of an integral Yugoslavianism with the idea of organic 
Yugoslavianism. The emergent controversy between the two 
rival interpretations remained unresolved until the Eighth 
Congress of the LCY (December 1964) finally and resolutely 
disavowed any assimilationist intent. A spokesman for the 
League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) warned that the 
insistence on the withering away of Yugoslavia's nation, 
voiced in the wake of the Seventh Congress by advocates of 
integral Yugoslavianism, reflected narrow-minded chauvinism 
and creeping unitarism. Tito condemned "the idea that the 
unity of our peoples means the elimination of nationalities 
and the creation of something new and artificial.
The Eighth Congress signified a turning point for 
Yugoslav nationalities policy and for interrepublican 
relations. Henceforth, it was no longer assumed 
Yugoslavia's nations were in the process of disintegration 
and Yugoslav socialist patriotism was clearly detached from 
Yugoslavianism. As a consequence, the republics at last 
came into their own as fully legitimate agents of popular 
sovereignty, and federalism was finally completely accepted 
by the LCY as genuinely appropriate.33 This change in 
nationalities policy provided the preliminary impetus toward 
the transformation of Yugoslavia into a system in which the 
republics could advance their distinct interests in an 
autonomous manner.
The Eighth Party Congress represented the first open 
discussion of the nationality question in postwar 
Yugoslavia. No longer did the LCY pretend Yugoslavia's 
national groups were somehow different from other national 
groups either in consciousness or behavior, Stalin's 
distinction between bourgeois and socialist nations was 
openly repudiated as an un-Marxist doctrinal innovation.34
The reassessment of Yugoslavianism created doubts about 
the whole notion of such a self-identification. In June 
1969, the Belgrade weekly magazine, NIN, conducted a survey 
asking people what they thought it meant to be a Yugoslav.
By September 1969, the resulting article was under fire for 
unitarism, supra-statism, and negation of the equality of 
the peoples of Yugoslavia. In the 1971 census, only 273,177
persons declared themselves to be ethnically Yugoslav, a 14 
percent decline from 1961.35 Doubts remained as to whether 
this figure reflected anything more than mixed marriages or 
the sentiment of unpoliticized Muslims. Even the 
supposition that there was something immanently progressive 
about calling oneself a Yugoslav was questioned. Many 
Yugoslavs felt insulted if someone suggested a person was 
more patriotic simply because he declared himself a 
Yugoslav.3<*
However, in the 1981 census, some 1,216,463 citizens of 
Yugoslavia declared themselves Yugoslavs, a substantial 
increase over the 1971 figure.37 This development led some 
members of the party to applaud, but provoked doubt and 
skepticism in other quarters. Dushan Bilandzhich, a member 
of the central committee of the Croatian party, assailed the 
impression that Yugoslav nationality was somehow superior to 
Croatian. He argued there is no possibility of a Yugoslav 
nation being formed. Furthermore, he accused some newly 
converted Yugoslavs of antifederalist motives expressed in 
admiration of centralized administration. Bilandzhich 
implied the process of Yugoslavization was working 
specifically against the Croats and noted the disappearance 
of 30,000 Croats in Voyvodina. He also openly discarded the 
classical Marxist thesis of the withering away of 
nationality under communism and argued the reasons for 
affirming a Yugoslav nationality were insufficient and not 
persuasive.
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Bilandzhich awakened a chorus of criticism. His 
critics were distressed by his assertion that Yugoslavianism 
reflected centralist tendencies and quickly replied in kind. 
They insinuated Bilandzhich's real concern was shown in his 
lamentation over the decline of Croats in Voyvodina. His 
doubts about Yugoslavianism were portrayed as latent - 
Croatian nationalism.®®
However, since the early 1970s, the LCY has given 
renewed emphasis to Yugoslav socialist patriotism, with an 
organic interpretation. Yugoslav socialist patriotism lacks 
the supranational, assimilationist property of the earlier 
Yugoslavianism campaign, and is depicted as the 
identification with, feeling for, and love of the socialist 
community. The sentiment is ordinarily construed as the 
emotive bond which ties the individual to the collective.®^ 
However, some Yugoslav Marxists understand socialist 
patriotism to involve collective affinity at two levels. 
Devotion toward the narrow homeland— one's republic, and 
devotion toward the wider homeland— Yugoslavia as a whole. 
Wider patriotism does not exclude narrow patriotism, but 
actually presumes it. Thus, ethnonationalism thrown out the 
front door is quietly allowed entry through the rear.
Elements and Practices of Yugoslav Nationalities Policy
Yugoslav nationalities policy has eight major elements. 
First, the system recognizes the ethnic particularity and 
full equality of all nationality groups and guarantees the
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right of cultural-linguistic self-determination. Second, 
the system is organized as a federation with extensive 
decentralization and the right of political self- 
determination, including, in theory, the right of secession. 
Third, the LCY asserts the need to equalize economic 
conditions throughout the federal units and recognizes the 
equal claim of all nationalities to economic resources and 
standards.4® Fourth, ethnic tensions are defused through 
self-management, a grassroots system, at least in theory, 
for defusing social issues at the lowest level possible.41 
Fifth, religious organizations are advised to abstain from 
outspoken involvement on behalf of particular nationality 
groups (though the creation of an autocephalous Macedonian 
Orthodox Church in 1967 enjoyed active LCY support because 
it provided an institutional symbol of Macedonian ethnicity 
in the face of Bulgarian claims that Macedonians are merely 
Bulgarians). Sixth, decentralization translates interethnic 
relations into interrepublican relations. Seventh, dual 
consciousness is affirmed— ethnic consciousness and Yugoslav 
consciousness (Yugoslav socialist patriotism). And, eighth, 
separatism and unitarism are considered two forms of the 
same perilous deviation.
Contemporary Yugoslav nationalities policy combines 
radical decentralization and generous guarantees to the 
ethnic cultures with a negative perception of nationalism 
which often finds expression in shrill denunciations of 
neofascist nationalism and antisocialist chauvinism. The
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operating assumption of Yugoslav nationalities policy is 
that any exclusively nationalist sentiment is antisocialist. 
Any revival of excessive ethnic pride (such as might be 
manifested in the singing of certain songs) is by definition 
anticommunist and potentially prosecessionist. The reason 
for this fear of nationalism is, at least in part, that 
Yugoslavs, as Marxists, view nationalism not primarily as a 
spirit with which a nation is infused (nor even perhaps as a 
political doctrine extolling the nation as a supreme value 
and representing it as the dominant principle of societal 
organization) but as a relationship between two or more 
national societies, in which at least one society aspires 
to dominate, exploit, or despoil the other.
Thus, for Yugoslavia's Marxists, nationalism is a 
social relationship in which distinct national communities 
face each other with mutually exclusive demands tinged with 
resentment of the unmatched gains of the other. It is with 
this view of nationalism in mind that Tihomir Vlashkalich, 
president of the central committee of the League of 
Communists of Serbia (LCS), told his colleagues in 1976 that 
"to be a nationalist today, in conditions of national 
freedom and equality, means to be against the national 
freedom of others, to be against equality, and, finally, to 
even be against the freedom of one's own nation, because 
nationalism today can only serve interests in favor of 
hegemony and exploitation, and that is certainly not the 
working class.
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However, the LCY's abhorrence of nationalism is 
balanced by a scrupulous respect for the national 
sensitivities, linguistic rights, and cultural needs of all 
of Yugoslavia's national groups. Yugoslav nationalities 
policy recognizes two broad categories: (1) the nations 
(narodi), consisting of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Macedonians, Montenegrins, and, since 1971, Muslims; and (2) 
the "protected nationalities" (narodsnosti) consisting of 
Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians,
Romanians, Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, Gypsies, and 
Italians, amounting to 2,700,000 persons or 12 percent of 
the total population in 1981.43 (See Table 2) Yugoslavia's 
recent record on national rights is commendable for all 
groups except Gypsies. Only Macedonia's constitution 
accords the Gypsies equal status with the other national 
groups. In all the other federal units, the Gypsies, though 
guaranteed their legal rights as individuals, are treated as 
outcasts and denied any collective rights.44
As an example of Yugoslav national rights policy, 
Bulgarians who live in Macedonia enjoy daily broadcasts in 
Bulgarian. Several Bulgarian language publications are 
available— among them, the weekly Bratsvo (now twenty years 
old); Drugarcher, a magazine for youth; and Most, a journal 
for literature, science, and culture. Children of all 
nationalities are provided the option of schooling in their 
native languages through the high school or technical school 
level. Until recently, all Yugoslav pupils were obliged to
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study a language other than their own, The revocation of 
this requirement resulted in massive loss of interest in 
Serbo-Croatian among minority students.
Guarantees to minority national groups are especially 
evident in the more heterogeneous autonomous provinces. In 
Kosovo, all provincial laws are published in authentic texts 
in Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Turkish. State organs 
conduct public procedures in either Serbo-Croatian or 
Albanian or, if specified by statute in a given locality, in 
Turkish. However, official use of Albanian only dates from 
the early 1970s. In Voyvodina, provincial laws, 
declarations, and proposals appear in Serbo-Croatian, 
Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Ruthenian. All the 
republics guarantee their minority groups the right to 
establish organizations, to promote their communal 
interests, and to exercise their cultural rights— as long as 
the exercise of these rights does not becomes overtly 
nationalist or secessionist.
Yugoslavia recognizes three official languages: Serbo- 
Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian. Because of Croatian 
sensitivity to differences of orthography, spelling, and 
vocabulary, the Serbian and Croatian variants of Serbo- 
Croatian are usually both given. They are treated as 
distinct languages for legal purpose. But, for all 
practical purposes, the British and American variants of 
English are more distinct than Serbian is from Croatian. 
Thus, all treaties between Yugoslavia and other states are
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published in at least four languages— Serbian, Croatian, 
Slovenian, and Macedonian. All federal buildings in 
Belgrade are scrupulously identified in all four languages 
and the ingredients or instructions of many household 
commodities are, by law, painstakingly given in the four 
languages.^
The national groups are also safeguarded in other ways. 
The constitution guarantees the proportional representation 
of nationalities within the officer corps of the Yugoslav 
National Army (JNA), although there is clearly Serbian 
domination of the officer c o r p s . T h e  constitution also 
makes important concessions to the national banks of the 
republics. In addition, the republics are assured 
participation in international treaties affecting their 
interests.̂
The federal units play an important role in 
nationalities policy, not only in the administration of 
various cultural and educational programs, but also through 
the extension of substantial subsidies to minority 
institutions. For example, the Croatian republic increased 
subsidies for its national.minorities (except for Serbs in 
Croatia) by 20 percent for 1980. These subsidies were 
earmarked for the Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthene and 
Ukrainian Councils, for newspapers in those languages, and 
for the support of the Italian Union and Italian-language 
drama in Croatia.^®
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Yugoslav nationalities policy necessarily assumes an 
economic dimension because of the Marxist tenet that 
political equality is impossible without economic equality. 
Given the marked disparities between the wealthier northern 
republics and the poorer southern republics, the 
establishment of institutional mechanisms for the channeling 
of resources to the underdeveloped regions is viewed as a 
political imperative. This theme has developed a sense of 
urgency since the inflammation of Albanian nationalism in 
Kosovo.^ Therefore, it is not surprising that Yugoslavia's 
social plans underline the need to accelerate development in 
Kosovo and the underdeveloped republics.
Thus, Yugoslav nationalities policy can be understood 
as a multifaceted assault on the roots of internal discord, 
and a comprehensive program of socialization to Yugoslav
i
socialist norms of brotherhood and unity. Although Yugoslav 
nationalities policy clearly tackles problems at the 
economic base, this is not in itself considered sufficient 
to effect the desired metamorphosis of the superstructure.50 
The system has yet to snuff out all traces of neo-Hegelian 
idealism.
In one of his last works, Edvard Kardelj (the LCY's 
chief theoretician), concluded that changes in group 
behavior follow and often require changes in group 
consciousness. Therefore, it is not enough to introduce 
constitutional and institutional changes. Changes must also 
take place in the collective consciousness.51 In other
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words/ the Yugoslav equivalent of the New Soviet Man must 
develop before problems of an interethnic character can be 
considered to have been resolved once and for all.
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CHAPTER III 
THE CROATION CRISIS: 1967-1972 
The Eighth Congress of the LCY, held in December 1964, 
had the task of assuaging the surfacing tensions in 
interrepublican relations. The Eighth Congress was the 
occasion for the first open discussion of the national 
question and for a somewhat nebulously worded agreement to 
undertake economic reform. As the Congress began, Croatian 
liberals immediately started to argue the case for economic 
optimalization (the use of profit criteria in investment), 
and questioned the lack of circumspection with which 
investment resources had been funneled into the south. 
Drawing on support from Slovenia and Macedonia, the Croats 
achieved a partial victory at this congress. But, the 
consensus reached was a flimsy and even superficial one. 
Rival and contradictory economic orientations were 
incorporated into resolutions adopted at the Eighth 
Congress.
The reform and the subsequent political devolution, 
which led to the present day institutional configuration of 
Yugoslavia, were to a considerable extent the handiwork of 
the liberals. They had won by wrenching control of the 
system from the conservatives.2 By 1972, however, the 
liberals lost the reins of power to a coalition of party 
centrists (Titoists).
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The liberal coalition applied pressure both through its 
representatives in Belgrade and through vigorous self- 
assertion within the areas of its collective geographic 
jurisdiction. Between 1965 and 1966, they were able to push 
reforms which dramatically reduced the prerogatives of the 
federal government in the economic sector. Federal 
subsidies to industry were slashed— a clear victory for 
Croatia and Slovenia and a setback for the centralists, 
whose strongholds at that time were not only in Serbia but 
also in Kosovo and Montenegro. Profitability became the 
chief criterion for the allocation of resources.3
The market reform of 1965 effectively ended the golden 
age of political factories, and central investment planning 
was abandoned. Yet, the Serbs were not unconditional 
losers. They continued to dominate the national banks, and 
the reforms were not inimical to Belgrade's larger 
corporations. Moreover, the distinction between advocacy of 
pluralist decision making through republican coalitions or 
along territorial/ethnic lines was blurred by the temporary 
alliance of proponents of both approaches in the fight 
against unitarism.4
At the same time, concern over the slide toward 
political pluralism was growing among Serbs. The Serbs are 
sensitive to accusations of Serbian hegemony and harbor 
lingering resentment against the Croats for the 
establishment of an independent Croatia in World War II, and 
the concomitant massacres of Serbs.5 It is important to
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remember /the LCY established itself on the wreckage of the 
Serbian Chetniks, who under the leadership of General Drazha 
Mihailovich had waged successful and heroic warfare against
is combined with the conviction of many Serbs that 
centralism provides the greatest good for the greatest
internationalists in Yugoslavia, and have been abused and
By 1969, there were other changes in republican 
orientations. Voyvodina, which had been associated with 
Croatian and Slovenian demands for further decentralization 
of the economic system, began to back off. Montenegro 
steadily became more anti-Serbian, if not exactly pro- 
Croatian. And Croatia, shorn of support to the north and 
east, began actively courting Kosovo.9 Yugoslavia was 
beginning to take on the characteristics of an international 
balance of power system.
At the Tenth Session of the Croatian central committee 
in 1969, amid criticism of Belgrade's continued unitarianism 
which underestimated the seriousness of the national 
question, the Croats launched a campaign aimed at further 
devolution of authority to the republics.^-8 Eventually, the 
intersection of economic grievances with the perception of 
cultural threat propelled the Croatian leadership beyond the 
bounds of tolerable political behavior, provoking a 
systemwide crisis.
mixture of historically rooted emotions
n u m b e r .  ̂ Serbs feel they are indeed the only true
exploited by the other nationalities.8
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Economic Exploitation
Despite the economic reforms, the Croats quickly became 
disgruntled. Change was too slow and not always in the 
direction favored by the Croats. They also claimed economic 
resources and credits were more concentrated in Belgrade 
than ever before. In the course of September and November 
of 1971, Hrvatski tjedik, the weekly newspaper of Matica 
Hrvatska11 (The Croatian Cultural Society), published a 
series of articles which attempted to show how Belgrade's 
banks had monopolized credit in Dalmatia and squeezed out 
the indigenous Croatian banks.^
By 1971, it had become impossible to divorce economics 
from politics. It seemed clear to an increasing number of 
Croats that they were being exploited because they were 
Croats. The Croats noted that Generalexport, a Belgrade 
company which was knee deep in the Croatian hotel industry, 
was permitted to set up its own airline long before 
permission for a Croatian airline was granted.^ since this 
was Yugoslavia's (i.e., Serbia's) second airline, the Croats 
could only conclude the forces of unitarism were still 
entrenched.14 More disturbing to Croats was Shime Djodan's 
argument that Croatia had been forced to accept a deficit in 
trade with every other republic in the Yugoslav federation, 
even while netting a sizeable surplus in foreign trade. 
Djodan, an economist and leading Croatian nationalist, 
identified Croatia's interests with liberalism and
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associated Yugoslav conservatives with centralism (i.e., 
Serbianism).15
Perceived Cultural and Demographic Threats
Croatian nationalists who anxiously warned Croats of 
impending Serbianization were convinced the threat was real. 
The Serbian menace was thought to take three forms: the 
Serbianization of the Croatian language, the demographic 
displacement of Croats by Serbs, and the perceived Serbian 
catering to Dalmatian sentiment in order to split Croatia in 
two. These three movements were read by the overwhelming 
majority of Croats as symptoms of a Serbian threat. 
Population movements can be explained as strictly economic 
phenomena, and linguistic homogenization is a typical 
epiphenomenon of modernization. Even the stirrings of 
Dalmatian ethnic self-identity might have been interpreted 
as a genuine manifestation of endogenous currents. However, 
the Croatian public did not view these developments as 
isolated features. Increasingly, the talk was of Croatia's 
need to defend itself.1®
In December 1954, the cultural associations of those 
federal units in which Serbo-Croatian is the lingua franca 
(Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Voyvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
convened to make arrangements for collaborating on the 
creation of a common orthography for the entire country and 
to produce a definitive Serbo-Croatian dictionary.1^ Matica 
Srpska, the Serbian cultural organization, had succeeded in
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persuading other participants that creation of a unified 
standards dictionary and orthography was in the interests of 
all national groups. When the first two volumes of this 
dictionary were finally published in 1967, they inflamed the 
Croatian public. Common Croatian vocabulary and expressions 
were often relegated to the status of a local dialect; the 
Serbian variant was presented as the standard, the Croatian 
as the deviation.1®
In reaction, the Croats set about compiling a new 
Croatian dictionary and began the "purification" of the 
Croatian language from Serbian infiltration.19 Ironically, 
in the Dictionary of the Croatian Lanqauqe first published 
in 1901 and considered authoritative in 1968, Croatian 
academics conceded that Serbian roots and culture were the 
source of over 90 percent of Croatian words. Croatians were 
angered by Matica Srpska's insistence that Croatian is only 
a dialect of Serbian. Serbian academicians argued the 
language of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and Bosnian Muslims 
is a single language with negligible variations. But, 
Croatian scholars answered this reasoning with the 
observation that the Serbian position would stifle the 
autonomous development of Croatian, Montenegrin, and other 
languages— even Serbian.^1
From a purely linguistic point of view, Serbo-Croatian 
is obviously a single language. But this was an ethnic and 
political controversy, not a linguistic or scientific one.
In autumn 1971, the publication of the new Croatian
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Orthography (Hrvatski pravopis) with a new dictionary of the 
"purified Croatian language" precipitated Serbian 
condemnations. Serbs warned this new dictionary would 
exacerbate growing ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs, 
not help heal them.22
Croatians also began to speak of a demographic threat. 
Croatia's population was proportionately older than the 
population of any other republic except Slovenia. Moreover, 
the large emigration of Croatian workers to Western Europe, 
which had formerly been viewed as an economic opportunity, 
was suddenly construed to be a Serbian plot to move younger 
Croats out of their homeland. This situation was compounded 
by another variable— the increasing influx of Serbs into 
Croatia. These Serbian immigrants were believed to be 
taking the places relinquished by the Croatian emigration. 
Croatian nationalists entreated the LCC to prevent any more 
Serbs from moving into Croatia.2"* Simultaneously, concerned 
Croats organized to "reclaim" immigrants of earlier 
centuries who had been hitherto written off as Serbian. The 
immigrants were recast (as they were during World War II 
under the fascist Pavelich regime) as "Orthodox Croats,"2  ̂
thus confounding the traditional canon that a Croat is 
Catholic and a Serb is Orthodox.
The Serbian Orthodox Church has always resented the 
tenth century forcible transfer of Dalmatia from Byzantium's 
jurisdiction to the authority of Rome. As the 1970s began, 
Serbian interest in Dalmatia was more openly expressed. The
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Serbian Orthodox Church published a book entitled Serbs and 
Orthodoxy in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik. During 1971, a ring of 
Serbian nationalists printed and distributed pamphlets which 
called for the immediate organization of autonomous Serbian 
provinces in Dalmatia and Croatia.^ The central committee 
of the LCC considered it necessary to condemn Dalmatian 
autonomism as a unitarist, anti-Croatian ruse. Thus, 
Croatian nationalists had reason to believe Dalmatian 
autonomism was reviving, and Serbian interference was 
tangibly present.^
The Dalmatians continue to view themselves as distinct 
from other Croats. In most cases, this view is as harmless 
as a Texan's pride in being Texan. But, the Croatian 
central committee took pains to make it absolutely clear 
that no province in Croatia had any ethnic or historical 
basis for seeking autonomous status. Dalmatian autonomism 
could lay no claim to any category of legitimacy, because it 
was nothing less than "treason" against the Croatian 
nation.^
The Croatian Reaction
Threatened, as they saw it, with the suppression of 
their language, the obliteration of their people, and the 
usurpation of their land, the Croats reacted aggressively. 
They repudiated the antimony of nationalism and patriotism, 
and challenged the socialist doctrine that Yugoslav 
patriotism is immeasurably superior to ethnic nationalism.
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The Croats also began to look for institutional-legal 
measures to safeguard the Croatian nation from the Serbs.
The argument made was the Croatian nation would cease to be 
manipulated and exploited only if it realized its statehood, 
and only complete sovereignty could guarantee 
interrepublican equality.28 Otherwise, Croatia would 
continue to serve as a "plaything" for other Yugoslav 
actors. In a classic expression of balance of power 
thinking, one Croat even argued "Croatia must be set as the 
criterion at every moment, in every undertaking. Nothing 
can be done to benefit others that would at the same time be 
contrary to Croatia's interests." The dividing line between 
statehood and secession or self-interest and rejection of 
fellow Yugoslavs was often fuzzy.28
Until late in 1969, the leaders of Slovenia and 
Voyvodina supported the Croatian leadership's demands for 
further decentralization of the banking system and reform of 
the foreign currency exchange systems.28 The catch phrase 
"5 to 1" began to acquire popularity among Croats as early 
as 1968. The phrase signified the widely held view that 
Croatia's demands for change were always opposed by the 
other five Yugoslav republics and therefore Croatia stood 
alone.21
In May 1968, Stipe Shuvar, a conservative leader within 
the LCC, blasted Croatian nationalism as emotional, 
irrational mysticism "dragged up from the trash heap of 
history" (Trotsky's phrase). In response, Shuvar was
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personally upbraided by friends and acquaintances for being 
a "Serbophile, a Yugo-agent, and a unitarist."32 However, 
Shuvar refused to budge and condemned the revival of 
"Croatian petit bourgeois nationalism." He asserted 
Croatian nationalism was characterized by the conviction 
that all of Croatia's misfortunes were caused by the 
activities of the other Yugoslav nations (especially the 
Serbs); by dependence on, and willingness to serve, various 
foreign imperialistic force (Orthodox Russia); by a mystic 
belief in the superiority of the Croatian nation;33 and by 
the tenet that Croatian nationalism can only blossom with 
the carving up of Yugoslavia. The thrust of Shuvar's 
portrayal was unmistakable. Croatian nationalism is 
misguided, ethnocentric, and dangerous.3  ̂ But Shuvar's 
capacity to influence Croatian public opinion was minimal.
Many Croats, especially intellectuals and liberal party 
officials
behaved with unalloyed obtuseness toward their 
non-Croat colleagues, especially the Serbs. At a 
meeting of the Yugoslav council on Visual Arts, 
the Croatian delegation walked out when they were 
defeated by a 5-to-l vote on the issue of moving 
the administrative headquarters to a different 
republic capital every two years at the time of 
biennial meetings. The Croats dismissed the 
arguments of their colleagues from the other 
republics that biennial shifts were not only 
uneconomical, but self-defeating since close 
contact with foreign cultural groups and 
exhibitions— one of the organization's principal 
purposes— could best be handled in Belgrade where 
all the embassies are located.35
Visiting academicians attending scholarly conferences 
in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, were likely to find
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themselves being corrected by militant Croats for use of 
Serbian words instead of Croatian. The new Croatian 
dictionary was replete with archaisms and exotic neologisms 
designed to eliminate anything which might be construed as a
Serbian expression. A meeting of teachers and writers
demanded the revision of school history books, particularly 
to refute overwhelming evidence of Croatian collaboration 
with the Nazis. They wanted to give greater emphasis to 
specifically Croatian achievements and called for devoting 
two-thirds of the time alloted to history lessons to 
Croatian culture and history.36
Until the end of 1969, the Croatian party leadership 
had not taken a clear stand on the nationalist revival, 
primarily because neither of its two principal factions had 
been able to get the upper hand. Milosh Zhanko, a 
conservative member of the party, exhorted his colleagues to
keep the interests of the entire country uppermost in their 
minds and to subordinate Croatian interests to Yugoslav 
interests. As a result, he polarized the Croatian party, 
alienated most of his passive supporters, and provoked a 
counterattack.3^
At the Tenth Plenum of the central committee of the LCC 
(January 15-17, 1970), the president of the central 
committee, Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar, led the attack on 
Zhanko. She claimed the struggle against unitarism and the 
struggle against nationalism were two sides of the same 
coin. But, because of the influence of deluded unitarists
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like Zhanko, the LCC had devoted its energies exclusively to 
the struggle against nationalism. She concluded the 
Croatian party organization would have to devote greater
Opattention to combating unitansm. 0 Dabchevich-Kuchar 
interpreted Zhanko's position as disloyal, and the LCC 
rebuffed him for antiparty views, stripped him of his posts, 
and attested that "the struggle against nationalism cannot 
be waged from unitarist battlements."2^
After the Tenth Plenum, the LCC drew steadily closer to 
the ideology of Matica Hrvatska and the nationalists. An 
internal alliance was being forged to replace the moribund 
interrepublican alliance with Slovenia, Voyvodina, and 
Macedonia. The Tenth Plenum was a turning point in that it 
was the first time a republican central committee had 
rendered an assessment of problems of further policy 
development (and of the state of interethnic relations) 
independently of central party organs. The LCC was coming 
into its own, speaking for Croatia as a body of Croatian 
politicians.40
The Croatian revival reclaimed the heroes of the past. 
Croats began reexamining their history, searching for 
leaders who had been swept under the carpet by the communist 
regime. Stjepan Radich, founder of the Croatian peasant 
party in the interwar period,41 became overnight the most 
popular politician in Croatia, with Miko Tripalo, the 
secretary of the central committee in second place, and 
Tito, possibly a distant third.42
Matica Hrvatska went on the offensive, bent on "de- 
Serbianizing" the Croatian language. In June 1971, Matica 
Hrvatska organized an open meeting to discuss the Zadar 
Review (Zadarska revija). The discussion became intense and 
bitter, with Matica Hrvatska complaining that the Review1s 
langauge was "impure," a concatenation created by the 
contributions of a staff drawn not merely from Croatia but 
from various parts of Yugoslavia.4  ̂ Matica Hrvatska also 
pressured Yugoslav Railways, objecting that its exclusive 
use of the ekavian variant (Serbian) was prejudicial to the 
Croatian language. Under additional pressure from the LCC 
in Zagreb, Yugoslav Railways agreed that by September 1971, 
all railway notices, schedules, and forms would also be 
printed in the ijekavian variant (Croatian). Hrvatski 
tjednik protested that the buses servicing the Zagreb 
airport were marked "Jugoslovenski Aerotransport" (correct 
Serbian) rather than "Jugoslavenski Aerotransport" (correct 
Croatian.44 The pettiness to which such disputes can 
descend was shown by the Croatian transport administration, 
which issued notices that the road between the settlements 
of Skrad, the "Goranka " tavern and Stubica would be closed. 
The reference to the tavern was to avoid haying to name the 
village where it was located— Srpske (Serbian) Moravice.4  ̂
Every federal unit was struck by nationalist outbursts 
in the early 1970s. There were strong anti-Serbian feelings 
among all the non-Serbian nationalities. Nationalist 
discontent was most visible in Croatia and Kosovo and
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followed in decreasing intensity by Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Voyvodina.
Serbian nationalism was a particular problem among the 
Serbs of Croatia. It escalated at this time as a response 
to the wave of Croatian nationalism, as an adjunct of 
persistent Great Serbian chauvinism centered in the Serbian 
republic, and as a reflection of the traditional, 
religiously derived distrust Croatia's Serbs have long felt 
toward their Croatian cousins (particularly after the World 
War II massacres of Serbs in Croatia).4®
Prosvjeta, the Serbian cultural society in Croatia,47 
started to change its character around 1969 and became a 
stronghold for Serbian nationalists and former Chetniks. 
Exploiting this institutional base, Croatia's Serbian 
nationalists sought in 1970 to create a Serbian autonomous 
province within Croatia and demanded a separate network of 
special Serbian schools. Some Croatian Serbs even broached 
the idea of seceding from the Croatian republic and 
attaching themselves to the Serbian republic.4® Although 
nationalist sentiment was most systematically organized in 
Croatia, it is apparent that by the early 1970s, this 
dangerous system-threatening sentiment had spread throughout 
Yugoslavia.4^
The Croatian National Movement Accelerates
The various factions in the Yugoslav debate over the 
federalization of the LCY— democratizers, liberals,
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nationalists/ humanists, and conservatives— had their 
counterparts within the LCC. There were the liberals, such 
as Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar, Miko Tripalo, and their coterie, 
together with technocrats and economic reformers; the 
nationalists, such as Shime Djodan, Marko Veselica (a 
Croatian economist),5^ and the exploding membership of 
Matica Hrvatska; and the group of centralist-humanists known 
as the Praxis group. In addition to these three groups were 
the conservatives, including Milosh Zhanko and Stipe Shuvar.
The nationalists had, by early 1971, found natural 
ideological allies in the liberals. When, in February 1971, 
the conservative members of the Croatian executive committee 
demanded that resolute action be taken against Matica 
Hrvatska and Dabchevich-Kuchar, the liberals blocked the 
action. However, the conservative anti-nationalists scored 
a victory, in July 1971, when they succeeded in having Shime 
Djodan and Marko Veselica expelled from the party as 
ringleaders of ethnocentric turmoil.51 But this victory was 
an isolated triumph, for the tide was turning against the 
conservatives.
Membership in Matica Hrvatska soared to 41,000 members 
in fifty-five branches by November 1971 (up from 2,323 
members in thirty branches in November 1970).52 The 
nationalists also made steady inroads among establishment 
news organs. Even Vjesnik, the Croatian party publication, 
drew closer to the nationalists. Radio-Television Zagreb 
began to carry all of Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar's speeches in
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their entirety, while systematically curtailing programming
from other Yugoslav stations and information regarding other
parts of the country.53
In this politically fluid situation, the Croatian
conservatives employed any and all available means in their
struggle for control of the Croatian party. Ironically,
they found allies in the humanists of the Praxis group,5^
who possessed an ideologically rooted antipathy toward
decentralization, nationalism, and even federalism (which
the humanists considered a unnecessary compromise with
Marxism).55 When the Croatian district court of Sisak
banned the May-August 1971 issue of Praxis, because of an
article which contained a searing indictment of the rising
nationalist movement in Yugoslavia (particularly in Croatia)
and which linked nationalism with the efforts of an
"unproletarian"55 new middle class to consolidate its
position, the conservatives took the issue to the Croatian
Supreme Court.5  ̂ Both sides in the contest knew exactly how
Praxis figured in the struggle:
The consistently outspoken and hostile attacks of 
the Praxis collaborators on the spirit of 
nationalism had made it increasingly urgent for 
the nationalist ideologues to discredit Praxis in 
the public eye and to impair...its further 
activity.... It is unlikely, therefore, that 
Praxis' strategic value in the struggle against 
"nationalist deformations" went unnoticed by the 
federal authorities, and it cannot be doubted that 
calculations such as these played some role in the 
Croatian Supreme Court's 1971 decision to overturn 
the Sisak District Court's ban on the contested 
issue of Praxis.®
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At the same time, Tito was watching developments in 
Croatia with increasing concern and, early in July 1971, 
traveled to Zagreb to talk with Croatia's leadership. Tito 
revealed to them his misgivings that Croatia was sliding 
back to the atmosphere of the prewar era and implied the 
republican leadership was losing control of the situation. 
"Are we going to have 1941 all over again?" Tito asked.
"That would be a catastrophe."6  ̂ Of special concern to Tito 
was the cult of Stjepan Radich. "Radich's organization was 
a kulak organization, he hated communists and did not 
represent the interests of the working class. We offered to 
cooperate with him, but he did not want anything to do with 
us," said Tito.
Clearly, Tito remained the ultimate arbiter in 
interrepublican and— so it seemed— intrarepublican affairs. 
When he brought the full force of pressure to bear, a 
republican leadership almost always had to yield ground.
But, since Tito increasingly believed Yugoslav stability was 
best guaranteed when Yugoslavia operated as a self­
regulating system of broadly autonomous federal units, the 
republics perceived his interventions as setting limits of 
legitimate activity rather than aborting independent 
decision making.61
Therefore, the response of Croatia's nationalist 
communists to Tito's July lecture was not to cave in but to 
conclude Tito was poorly informed and needed to be 
enlightened. The nationalists managed to ameliorate Tito's
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fears in a carefully orchestrated reception for him in 
Zagreb in September 1971. Tito made an about-face and told 
his Zagreb audience, "I have been able to convince myself 
just how absurd certain stories about Croatia are— that 
there is no unity here, that people here think differently, 
that chauvinism blossoms and thrives here. None of that is 
true."62
Croatian nationalism now took a dangerous turn, 
riveting its attention on ethnically mixed Bosnia to the 
south. In the gathering storm, it was inevitable that 
Croatian eyes should turn to Bosnia. This territory had 
been part of Croatia during the reign of fascist Ustashe 
Croatia, and some twenty percent of its population consisted 
of ethnic Croats. Although today Bosnian Muslims make up a 
plurality of Bosnia's population, it should be noted that 
Bosnian Serbs comprised over half of the population before 
the Ustashe massacres of Serbs during World War II.6^
Matica Hrvatska asserted Croats were being denied their 
rights in Bosnia and other republics and, therefore, sought 
to set up branches in Bosnia and Voyvodina to cater to the 
needs of Croats in those areas. But, viewing this as 
cultural imperialism, neither Bosnia or Voyvodina would 
permit branches to be set up.6^
The End of the Nationalist Coalition
Ultimately, the nationalist groups gathered around 
Matica Hrvatska explicitly demanded complete Croatian
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independence. Secession became mainstream political 
sentiment in Croatia.65 In ethnically heterogeneous 
communities, friction between Croats and Serbs was 
commonplace, and there were reports that in some communities 
residents were "arming themselves in anticipation of a 
physical showdown."66
By failing to suppress Matica Hrvatska, the liberal 
Croatian party leaders lost their chance to save 
themselves.6  ̂ Croatia had threatened the territorial 
integrity of two fellow federal units (Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Voyvodina) and alienated a third (Serbia) by their 
chauvinist pose towards Serbs in Croatia. The nationalists 
had gone too far and thus the appearance of an anti- 
Croatian coalition was to be expected. The presence of the 
anti-Croatian coalition permitted the effective quashing of 
the movement by the federal government in league with the 
Croatian conservatives.68
In late October 1971, Vladimir Bakarich, a prominent 
Croatian conservative and former president of the LCC, 
journeyed to Sarajevo to court Bosnian support. He hoped to
escalate the intra-Croatia party contest to the federal 
level in order to defeat the coalition of Croatian liberals 
and nationalists. Branko Mikulich, a Bosnian Croat and 
president of the Bosnian party, was sensitive to the 
nationalist propaganda coming from Croatia and receptive to 
Bakarich's entreaties.69 Affected by the escalation of 
intraparty conflict, Miko Tripalo made a show of force. He
remarked, "The policy we are pursuing in Croatia cannot be 
changed. Our opponents think policy can be changed by 
replacing a few leaders. In order to achieve that, it would 
be necessary to replace thousands of leaders in Croatia. ... 
We have taken our fate in our hands and we will keep it in 
our hands."70 Within the same time period, Tito was meeting 
with army leaders in Bosnia. Whether he also met with 
Bakarich and Mikulich is unclear. However, he was being 
shown "suppressed TV reels of Croatian Communist mass 
meetings, with only Croatian flags [missing the communist 
red star] and with nationalist and anti-Tito slogans, 
shouts, songs and signs."71
Matica Hrvatska and Croatian student leaders knew the 
Croatian conservatives had undertaken a concerted effort to 
enlist Tito's support in throttling the nationalist-liberal 
coalition.72 Therefore, the Croatian Student's Union, in a 
dramatic gambit, organized a massive strike designed to 
undermine the conservative move by making it clear 
conservatism lacked a popular base. Some three thousand 
students met in Zagreb on November 22, 1971, and unanimously 
voted to begin a strike at 9 A.M. the following day. 
Ostensibly, they protested existing federal regulations 
governing hard currency, banking, commerce, linguistic 
policies, and military training. Since Slovenia and 
Voyvodina had backed out of an intrarepublican alliance with 
Croatia, the LCC had been courting leaders in Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Thus, it is interesting that representatives of
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the Native Macedonian Student's Club and of the Native Club 
of Kosovan Students, who were present at the pre-strike 
meeting, firmly supported the Croatian students.7-* Within a 
matter of days, at least 30,000 university student across 
Croatia were on strike.7^
Until the autumn of 1971, Tito had hoped it would be 
possible to effect a compromise with the forces in power in 
Croatia, and to let things develop more or less on their 
own. If the suppressed newsreel footage was not enough, the 
student strike helped convince Tito compromise was 
impossible. Liberalization, decentralization, and 
appeasement of Croatia had only fed the Croat's ever 
increasing hunger for autonomy. Yugoslav military 
intelligence later uncovered evidence some of the party 
leaders had been in contact with Croatian Ustashe emigre 
groups in West Germany.76
Tito considered sending troop into Croatia, but 
eventually he decided to decapitate the Croatian party 
leadership. On December 1, 1971, Tito convened a joint 
meeting of the party presidiums of the LCY and the LCC at 
Karadjordjevo, Voyvodina.76 At this meeting, the Twenty- 
first Session of the LCY presidency, it became.obvious just 
how isolated nationalist-liberal Croats were. The Serbian 
and Croatian conservatives led the assault, supported by 
ideological bedfellows from Voyvodina and Montenegro.
Bosnia, Slovenia, and even Kosovo (whose party was at that 
time still controlled by the Serbs) criticized Croatia's
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exclusivist nationalism and called for stern measures. The 
Croatian leaders were upbraided for their "unhealthy" 
liberalism, nonchalance with respect to counterrevolutionary 
groups, and use of student organizations to advance their 
political aims. The Croats were told to put their house in 
order.77 But, given the denunciation of the liberals, the 
Twenty-first Session could only strengthen the hand of the 
conservatives on the Croatian central committee.
Finally, on December 12, 1971, Miko Tripalo and Savka 
Dabchevich-Kuchar resigned their posts under pressure. In 
protest of Tripalo's resignation, five hundred student 
militants demonstrated four days in downtown Zagreb. They 
demanded the creation of a separate Croatian state, a 
response which only served to further implicate the liberals 
and strengthen Tito's hand.78 Helmeted riot police were 
sent in to occupy strategic points in Zagreb, while 
helicopters surveyed the streets from above. If necessary, 
the army was prepared to move in.78 A follow-up conference 
to the Twenty-first session declared that "nationalism has 
become ... the focal point for everything in our society 
that is reactionary, anti-socialist and anti-democratic, 
bureaucratic and Stalinist.88
In the aftermath of the crisis, literally tens of 
thousands of members were expelled from the party, most for 
failure to toe the party line,8^ while Shime Djodan, Marko 
Veselica,82 and the editor of Hrvatski tjednik were 
sentenced to long prison terms. Matica Hrvatska was shut
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down and its fourteen publications were put out of
commission. The backlash climaxed at the end of 1973 with a
purge of writers, film-makers, university professors, and 
former liberal leaders.88 However, Tito moved to undercut 
the popular bases of the Croatian nationalists by granting 
many of their economic demands, even though these demands
were secondary to their ethnic and cultural aspirations. In
a sense, Belgrade conceded that Croatia had been exploited 
and Croatia's contribution to the federal budget had been 
proportionally the largest.84
The Croatian crisis can be analyzed as a period in 
which the political actors tested the limits of Yugoslavia's 
federal system and, in some cases, attempted to transcend 
them. The processes of alliance building became pronounced, 
and alliances existed as tangible understandings and were 
consciously pursued. Thus, when Slovenia and Voyvodina 
backed away from the Croatian nexus, Croatia sought new 
allies in Kosovo and Macedonia.
However, interrepublican conflict in Yugoslavia cannot 
be characterized one-dimensionally. The Croatian crisis 
suggests that in a multinational state, fundamental 
confrontations are likely to be manifested on three levels: 
(1) the federal or central level, as a conflict between 
republican actors within a federal context; (2) the 
interrepublican level, as an unmediated conflict between the 
units themselves; and (3) the intrarepublican level, as a 
struggle between factions within the unit and a
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confrontation between cross-migrated diasporas (such as the 
Croatian Serbs or the Bosnian Croats) and their host 
cultures.
^sThe Yugoslav federation had weathered the crisis— but 
not without demonstrating the vulnerability of a system 
which is founded on the perceived self-interests of various 
ethnic groups, and on an ultimate arbiter like Tito.85 
Without an emotional attachment to the political aggregate 
(Yugoslav patriotism), the Yugoslav multiethnic state seemed 
at the time of the Croatian crisis to have become a 
collection of jealous, warring competitors in a balance of 
power system. /
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CHAPTER IV 
NATIONALIST STRIFE: 1970-1987 
Croatian nationalism and its political consequences 
represented the principal threat to the integrity and 
stability of the Yugoslav federation in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. But by the end of the 1970s, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Kosovo had become the loci of new 
ethnonationalist conflicts. The Muslim question and the 
persistence of separatist sentiment among Yugoslavia's 
Albanians are today the primary areas of nationalist 
disequilibrium in the Yugoslav system.
The conservative linkage of the Croatian nationalist 
movement with the rising middle class (stigmatizing it as 
"unproletarian") is thoroughly inapplicable to the situation 
in Kosovo. Nationalist discontent in Kosovo is to an 
appreciable degree a product of perceived economic 
deprivation. The "unproletarian" label is also irrelevant 
to the situation in Bosnia, where the Islamic community has 
figured as the chief advocate of a nationalism which is 
divorced from mere religious identity.
Therefore, a discussion and analysis of the Muslim 
question and of separatist pressures in Kosovo is useful in 
illustrating the depth of ethnic strife in Yugoslavia—  
strife which is at times related to the dominant Serb-Croat 
rivalry, and at other times completely independent of it.
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Moreover, an examination of Muslim problems and Albanian 
nationalism will aid in determining whether Yugoslavia does 
indeed resemble a balance of power system.
The Muslim Question
Long before Muslim consciousness became politicized, 
the question of Bosnia's status in the federation was 
recognized as critical to the stabilization of 
interrepublican politics. If Bosnia had been allowed to 
remain part of Croatia, leaving intact the eastern 
boundaries set by the World War II Croatian Ustashe state, 
the Croatian republic would have been assured of
overwhelming economic hegemony in the federation.^ However,
the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbia was 
equally unthinkable to a generation which had languished 
under Greater Serbian exploitation and had devoted more than 
two decades to the struggle against Serbianization. It was 
also unlikely a division of Bosnia between Croatia and 
Serbia could provide a basis for interethnic harmony.^ 
Therefore, a separate status for Bosnia was necessary to 
insure postwar stability in socialist Yugoslavia.
In the early postwar period, the Muslims were viewed as
the least "national" of Yugoslavia's peoples, even as
potentially anational (if they did not identify themselves 
as either Serbs or Croats).^ Throughout the postwar era, 
antagonistic groups advanced rival theories about the 
origins of the Bosnian Muslims. The Bogomil theory is a
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variant expostulated by Croatian nationalists. They hold 
that certain ethnic Croats embraced a Manichaean religion 
known as Bogomilism, were thereafter persecuted by both the 
Catholic and Orthodox churches, and converted to Islam when 
the comparatively liberal-minded Turks subsequently 
conquered the region.^
An alternative theory espoused by Serbs asserts the 
Muslims are in fact Serbian settlers who abandoned Orthodoxy 
and adopted Islam during the time of the Turkish 
occupation.^ Serbian ethnologists also claim some Serbian 
immigrants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
converted to Catholicism, so that many of today's Croats in 
Bosnia are Serbs by origin.
Muslim nationalists have advanced a third theory. They 
argue Bosnian Muslims have a Turkish origin and trace their 
antecedents to immigration from Anatolia. This theory 
contests the customary belief that the Bogomil sect was a 
spin-off from Christianity. Instead, they contend the 
Bogomils were a non-Christian sect whose doctrines were 
related to Islam. According to this theory, the only thing 
Slavic about the Bosnian Muslims is their language, which 
they absorbed from the indigenous population.® However,
Tito endorsed all three theories of Muslim ethnogenesis in 
an effort to deny exclusive legitimacy to any one theory.^
In February 1968, the central committee of the League 
of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina (LCB-H)resolved that 
"experience has shown the damage of various forms of
pressure and insistence, in the earlier period [1940-1968], 
that Muslims declare themselves ethnically to be Serbs or 
Croats because, as was demonstrated ... and as contemporary 
socialist experience continues to show, the Muslims are a 
separate nation." 4?hus, the 1971 census was the first in 
which "Muslim" was treated as a fully recognized 
nationality.8 Inevitably, Bosnian Serbs and Croats felt 
threatened by the specter of a new ethnic force./ As a 
result, the 1971 census witnessed considerable nationalist 
agitation in Bosnia (only partially in reaction to the 
Croatian Crisis). Some groups pressured citizens to declare 
themselves "Muslims, in the ethnic sense," while other 
groups pressured the Muslims to declare themselves 
"Yugoslavs, ethnically undeclared."9
The Macedonian party was sensitive to emerging Muslim 
nationalism because a segment of Macedonian-speaking 
citizens are Muslim, although the majority of Macedonians 
are Orthodox. In early 1971, the League of Communists of 
Macedonia (LCM) insisted that "Muslims who speak Macedonian 
are Macedonian" and that they were, as they viewed 
themselves, "Macedonians of Islamic faith." "Historically 
and scientifically," the secretariat of the central 
committee of the LCM maintained, "it is quite clear that 
Muslims of Slavic extraction living in Macedonia, who speak 
Macedonian, are nothing other than Macedonians."
Nova Macedonija, the official organ of the Macedonian 
party, warned that "the thesis about Muslims of Slavic
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origin in Macedonia, as parts of a nascent Muslim nation, 
conceals an immediate threat of the reawakening of an old 
hegemonism vis-a-vis Macedonian nationality, history, and 
culture." The LCM adamantly denied Muslims in Macedonia 
have any ethnic tie whatsoever with Muslims in Bosnia. The 
party believed there was nothing peculiar about Macedonians 
being either Orthodox or Muslim, adding that Albanians 
living in Macedonia can be Muslim, Catholic, or Orthodox.1^
Kosovo entered into the fray when the Kosovan party 
offered that "Muslim ethnic affiliation cannot be connected 
with this or that republic or spoken language, because every 
citizen, without regard to where he lives, enjoys the same 
freedom of expressing his national or ethnic affiliation, 
which cannot be confused with religious affiliation."
Kosovo had repudiated the Macedonian position that Muslims 
who speak Macedonian are, ipso facto, Macedonian, and 
allowed for the possibility that a portion of Macedonia's 
population might indeed be Muslim— in the ethnic sense.
Most important to the debate, and to the possibility 
Yugoslavia was evolving into a system of shifting 
interrepublican alliances, is that the position advanced by 
each republic was the theory most appropriate to its own 
conditions. Each unit attempted to impose its own theory on 
the other units and to seek adherents within other units, 
even though any theory was only germane to a particular 
republic. Bosnia wanted religiocultural heritage accepted 
as a sufficient basis for national identity. Macedonia
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preferred to emphasize language and ethnic descent, while 
Croatia favored ethnic descent. Kosovo, with a mixed 
population of Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian Muslims, 
plus Orthodox Serbs, Albanians, and Macedonians, and even 
some Catholic Albanians, decided to articulate what 
superficially appeared to be the most tolerant approach.12
Eventually, the Serbian party lent oblique support to 
the Bosnia-Kosovo coalition when Latinka Perovich, secretary 
of the central committee of the LCS, declared it a matter of 
LCY policy that all people in Yugoslavia must be free to 
determine their own ethnic affiliation. This vaguely 
formulated statement amounted to a reprimand of Macedonia 
and Croatia and succeeded in bringing the question of 
Macedonian to a temporary close.^
The Kosovan-Macedonian quarrel over Muslim nationality 
resurfaced in the months preceding the 1981 census. A noted 
Macedonian historian, Niyazi Limanovi, argued the Albanians 
of Kosovo were utilizing Islam in a strategy to de- 
Macedonize Macedonia. Limanovi concluded there were some 
50,000 Muslim Macedonians in Macedonia who had previously 
reported themselves to be Albanians, Muslims, or even Serbs. 
He insisted they should declare themselves to be Macedonian 
Muslims in the forthcoming census. Ali Hadri, a Kosovan 
historian, remonstrated against Limanovi's attempt to pin 
the Macedonian label on Muslims in Macedonia and asserted 
ethnic identity was a matter of individual determination— a 
right guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution.
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After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Bosnian 
Muslim clergy became increasingly active spokesmen for 
Muslim ethnic interests. They repeatedly sought permission 
to establish cultural institutions to stimulate Muslim 
national identity.14 More recently, nationally conscious 
Muslims have renewed efforts to found autonomous cultural 
institutions. Citing the existence of Matica Hrvatska and 
Matica Srpska, Muslim nationalists demanded the 
establishment of a Matica Muslimanska and the organization 
of Muslim cultural-artistic societies. But the LCY has 
consistently blocked such endeavors, calling them efforts to 
obtain a "privileged status" and to establish a power base 
from which to pursue a policy of "discrimination against the 
other religions."
A new generation of Muslims, educated to think of 
Bosnian Muslims as a national group and encouraged by 
contacts with the Middle East, has begun to look to Islam as 
a basis for political mobilization.15 In April 1983, 
Yugoslav authorities uncovered an illegal organization of 
Bosnian Muslims described as working for the creation of an 
Islamic republic in Yugoslavia and having illegal ties with 
"reactionary" Muslims abroad. Eleven persons, including two 
imams, were put on trial and sentenced to prison for terms 
averaging more than eight years.16
Some Bosnian Muslim clergy have tried to draw a line 
between "positive political activity" and "negative 
political activity" on the part of religious organizations,
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and thus claim for the Islamic community a legitimate role 
in the political constellation.17 This has often been 
combined with a desire to stress religion, which is, after 
all, the source of Muslim ethnicity. But the LCY, which 
fears the identification of religion and nationality, wants 
to have it both ways— to derive a new nationality from a 
religion but yet to deny that derivation and suppress 
demands based on it.
The rising tide of Muslim nationalism in Yugoslavia 
probably owes more to indigenous factors than to any 
external e f f e c t s . T h e  era of the Croatian Crisis was an 
important catalyst for Muslim nationalism, insofar as 
Croatian calls for the annexation of all or part of Bosnia 
provided the sort of cultural threat which quickly inflames 
ethnic sensitivities. However, Muslim nationalism in 
Yugoslavia did predate the worldwide Islamic revival by 
several years.19
It is somewhat ironic that Tito, in one of his last 
public addresses (November 25, 1979), claimed "the nations 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be proud of their successes ... 
because they have succeeded in outgrowing mutual conflicts 
and frictions among nationalities." The famous Yugoslav- 
Montenegrin dissident, Milovan Djilas, chided "the problem 
has been solved— but not definitively. From a functional 
point of view, it can be argued the Bosnian Muslims are a 
balance of power mechanism which serves to keep the Croats 
and Serbs from destroying each other. This seems to be the
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view of the LCY, even if it does fear the growth of rampant 
Muslim nationalism. The crux of the Muslim question is that 
the nationalist fever in Bosnia continues to spread among a 
group which constitutes only 40 percent of the republic, 
though elements in the remaining 60 percent continue to have 
serious doubts about the validity of the Muslim claim to 
nationality.
Albanian Nationalism in Kosovo
Albanian nationalism is a problem for Yugoslav 
interrepublican relations for at least five reasons: (1) it 
directly affects Kosovo's relations with Serbia, Macedonia, 
and Montenegro (since Kosovo was long dominated by Serbs, 
and since there are also many Albanians in Macedonia and 
Montenegro); (2) Albanian agitation for republican status 
for Kosovo has an impact on the interrepublican balance of 
power (Kosovo is the central force for the upgrading of 
Yugoslavia's autonomous provinces); (3) the nationalism of 
one ethnic group has an incendiary effect on the others; (4) 
the threat of secession is not merely a matter of concern to 
the federation as a whole but also to its several parts; and 
(5) Kosovo represents ultimate test of the validity of 
Yugoslav nationalities policy and, in particular, of the 
Marxist premise that economic equality causes nationalist 
tempers to abate.
Nearly one-half of the world's Albanians live in 
Yugoslavia. Most of Yugoslavia’s Albanians live in Kosovo
(about 1.2 million), with the remainder in Macedonia 
(350,000) and Montenegro (50,000).21 There is also an 
important pocket of Albanians in Belgrade. During World War 
II, the Kosovo region was attached to Italian-dominated 
Albania. For several years after the war officially ended, 
Albanian guerrilla groups held out in Kosovo, desperately 
resisting reincorporation into Yugoslavia.22 In the winter 
of 1956, the Yugoslav secret police attempted to confiscate 
the weapons of Kosovo's Albanians. This project provoked 
resistance and resulted -in the deaths of a number of 
Albanians before an estimated nine thousand firearms were 
confiscated. However, the deterioration in Kosovo's 
political equilibrium is normally traced to 1966, when 
revelations of Serbian dominance of the governmental, party, 
and security apparatus in Kosovo inflamed resentment among 
the Kosovan Albanians.22
After reviewing conditions in Kosovo, the Fourth Plenum 
(1966) of the central committee of the LCY warned of Greater 
Serbian tendencies within the ranks of the LCY. The 
consensus was that Greater Serbian nationalism was an 
unnecessary stimulus to existing Albanian separatism and had 
to be expunged. Albanian separatism was identified as a 
problem at this time, even though Kosovo had not yet been 
shaken by ethnic riots.2^ These developments sent Serbian 
conservatives and nationalists into a rage. They castigated 
Albanian nationalism and irredentism in Kosovo, and lamented 
that Serbs had become the victims of systematic reverse
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discrimination insofar as employment in Kosovo was 
concerned. Yet, despite the resistance of Serbophile 
conservatives, Serbian domination of Albania was waning.2  ̂
The LCY agreed in the spring of 1968 to substitute the 
neutral term "Albanian" for the term "Shiptar," which the 
Albanians considered pejorative*0 but which had been the 
standard vocabulary in official as well as unofficial 
business.27 In early November 1968, the LCS proposed that 
the designations of the party organizations of the 
autonomous provinces be changed. Shortly thereafter, the 
"LCS for Voyvodina" became the League of Communists of 
Voyvodina (LCV), and the "LCS for Kosovo" became the League 
of Communists of Kosovo-Metohija (LCK). In mid-November 
1968, the Sixth Congress of the LCS authorized the 
provincial party organizations to pass their own statutes. 
The Albanian component was immediately strengthened in the 
Kosovan party. However, Albanians and Hungarians were still 
significantly underrepresented in the respective party 
organizations of Kosovo and Voyvodina.2®
Despite the attempts by the LCS to mollify Albanian 
resentment, Kosovo exploded in violence on November 27,
1968. Hundreds of demonstrators smashed shop windows and 
overturned cars in Prishtina (Kosovo's capital), and the 
anti-Serbian protest quickly spread to other towns in 
Kosovo. Some of the rioters demanded annexation by Albania, 
and crowds could be heard chanting "Long Live Enver Hoxha!" 
(the ruler of Communist Albania). The protestors drew up a
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list of demands which included dropping "Metohija" (a 
Serbian word, although "Kosovo" is also a Serbian word but 
part of the Albanian language) from the official name of the 
region. They demanded the redesignation of Kosovo as a 
republic, the extension of the right of self-determination 
to Kosovo (the right of a republic, not of an autonomous 
province), and the establishment of an independent 
university in Prishtina.^
In early December 1968, the disturbances spread to some 
Macedonian cities, and the LCY responded swiftly and 
decisively. The ring leaders of the apparently well- 
organized demonstrations received jail terms of up to five 
years, and those held chiefly accountable for unrest in 
Macedonia received sentences of up to seven years. By mid- 
February 1969, thirty-seven LCY member had been expelled 
from the party for participation or in support of the 
demonstrations.30
The federal government was not prepared to indulge in 
the partition of Serbia, but some concessions had to be 
given to the Albanians. The demand for republican status 
was flatly turned town. However, both Kosovo and Voyvodina 
were granted some of the prerogatives of republics and the 
modifier "socialist" was appended to their official 
designations (hence, the Socialist Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo).3* Kosovo-Metohija was renamed Kosovo, and the 
Kosovars were also given permission to fly the Albanian flag 
alongside the Yugoslav. Flying their national flag was
something Tito did not allow the Croats, but in the case of 
Kosovo, Tito felt the threat of separatism was not as 
imminent as the possible rebirth of Greater Serbian hegemony 
over Yugoslavia.33 Belgrade took steps to improve the 
economic situation in Kosovo, and to promote more Albanians 
to positions of authority. Finally, there followed the 
creation of an independent University of Prishtina in 1969, 
and the rapid Albanianization of both faculty and student 
body in what had been a branch of the University of 
Belgrade.33 Eventually, the introduction of an irredentist 
intelligentsia from the University of Tirana in Albania 
would prove to have dire consequences for interethnic 
relations in Kosovo.3^
For the Serbs, the demographic threat in Kosovo is 
particularly poignant because the region contains many 
shrines of the medieval Serbian kingdom of Tsar Dushan.35 
Most importantly, it was at Kosovo "Polje" (the Field of the 
Blackbirds) where the Serbian army was crushed by the Turks 
in 1389, and the battlefield had retained great patriotic 
pride for Serbs in the same way the defeat at the Alamo 
inspired Texans.36
However, Kosovo is now overwhelmingly inhabited by 
Albanians, who have by far the highest birthrate of all of 
Yugoslavia's peoples.37 Moreover, as a result of the 
turmoil, Albanian and Serbian neighbors became openly 
hostile and Prishtina university polarized along ethnic 
lines. Serbs and Montenegrins were often attacked on the
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streets, had their farms and crops destroyed, and many 
Orthodox churches and shrines were reduced to rubble by the 
predominantly Muslim Albanians. Consequently, thousands of 
Serbs and Montenegrins streamed out of Kosovo, most of them 
professionals and specialists with higher education. Even 
the dead were not immune to the ethnic hatred, as Albanians 
broke up Serbian and Montenegrin gravestones and unearthed 
graves in K o s o v o . R e l a t i o n s  between Albanians and 
Macedonians also remained tense as separatist Albanians in 
Macedonia were systematically suppressed and arrested.^
The problems with Albanian nationalism exhibited some 
of the same characteristics which marked the Croatian 
crisis. First, there were instances of anomic and 
collective violence manifested in the demonstrations of 
1968, the mutual incitement of the two national groups, and 
the Serbian exodus itself (although the exodus of Croatian 
Serbs was rather minimal compared to the number of Serbs 
fleeing Kosovo). Second, there were repeated instances 
providing evidence that members of the local nationality 
were prepared to organize in defense of their aspirations. 
For example, four Kosovan Albanians were imprisoned for 
plotting the secession of Kosovo and its attachment to 
Albania.^® Third, conflict in Kosovo, as in Croatia, was 
transmuted to the elite level. Thus, at the Twenty-ninth 
Plenum of the LCK in June 1971, Serbs and Montenegrins 
exchanged broadsides with Albanian delegates over questions 
of rights for the Serbian minority in Kosovo and alleged
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separatist plots.41 Finally, the Kosovo outbreak in 1968 
exemplifies conflict accommodation as practiced in communist 
Yugoslavia— jail the troublemakers but grant their non- 
disintegrative demands.
The Kosovo Crisis
Interethnic tensions remained high in Kosovo during the 
1970s. The heavily Albanianized security forces enjoyed 
only a brief respite between 1969 and 1973. In 1973 
Albanian separatists launched their first large-scale 
propaganda offensive since the demonstrations of November 
1968. Yugoslav security forces discovered evidence of an 
underground separatist organization known as the 
Revolutionary Movement of United Albania, but the security 
forces were unable to uproot it. This group, together with 
the so-called Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians 
of Yugoslavia, which may have enjoyed Albania's support, 
undertook what the federal government labeled "serious 
propaganda actions" in 1973-1975.42 The group called for 
the secession of Kosovo and those parts of Macedonia and 
Montenegro inhabited by Albanians. The crux of the 
secessionist plan was to form a Greater Albania which would 
be specifically anti-Serbian in nature. This "Marxist- 
Leninist" party was apparently uncovered by Yugoslav 
security organs in early 1975.42
Another underground group, dubbed the National 
Liberation Movement of Kosovo, was discovered during the
87
summer of 1975. Two of its leading members, both students 
at the University of Prishtina and heavily influenced by 
Albanian faculty members, were given lengthy prison 
sentences. Five more student groups were discovered between 
1979 and 1980. Security organs turned up still another such 
organization early in 1981, which, according to Yugoslavia's 
minister of the interior, had been operating in conjunction 
with the pro-Albanian "Red Front" organization.^
In addition to organized and semi-organized activity, 
sporadic violence repeatedly broke out in Kosovo during the 
1970s, and organized Albanian separatism was spreading to 
Macedonia. Between 1978 and 1981, Yugoslav security organs 
uncovered and suppressed two illegal Albanian separatist 
organizations operating in Macedonia. However, the 
situation was complicated by another factor. The 
increasingly Albanian-dominated provincial leadership in 
Kosovo was loathe to allow Serbian involvement in anti­
separatist efforts, partly because of a natural ethnic 
empathy for Albanians and party because of a fear the 
problems might incite the leadership of the Serbian republic 
to retract some of the political powers the LCK had 
acquired.
Thus, the provincial leadership engaged in a massive 
cover-up, the scale of which was only appreciated after the 
province exploded in violence in the spring of 1981.^ 
Certainly the LCY was well aware that trouble was brewing in 
Kosovo. The arrests of several hundred Albanian
nationalists in 1979, on charges of distributing subversive 
material, and a telltale eruption of ethnic turmoil in 
Kosovo in May 1980 were powerful reminders the festering 
discontent retained political significance. But Belgrade 
had only sketchy information about the Albanian separatist 
movement; the Kosovan ministry of the interior, which was 
well informed about the strength and escapades of a least 
some of the underground organizations, was withholding its 
intelligence.46
The information problem involved not merely the Serbia- 
Kosovo relationship but, in fact, was also an internal 
problem for Kosovo. District committees in the province 
were routinely withholding information from the provincial 
committee. In addition, the growing tendency to publish 
internal information in Albanian alone tended to leave local 
Serbs ignorant of important aspects of basic issues.47
Despite the evident latent instability in Kosovo, few 
observers were prepared for the virulence of the nationalist 
and ethnically inspired riots which shook the province in 
March and April of 1981. When Albanian students at the 
University of Prishtina went on a rampage on March 11, 
officials denied any ethnic link, and claimed the riot was 
sparked by dissatisfaction with bad cooking in the 
university cafeteria. Although some two thousand student 
were involved, the first wave of riots attracted little 
attention.46
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Subsequently, on April 1, violent riots broke out at 
the University of Prishtina (whose full-time student body 
numbered 37,000 at the time). Beginning with marauding 
protestors who smashed factory equipment and shop windows 
and set trucks on fire, tensions quickly escalated into open 
street battles, Some rioters even used kindergarten-aged 
children as shields against police. Most of the children 
were girls not in school because of the parochial proclivity 
of Albanian families to keep their female children from 
attending school. Miners from the nearby coal mine and 
workers from the electric power station in a neighboring 
town joined the students as the disorder spread to the 
general area around Prishtina. By April 3, the riot had 
spread, and hardly any municipality in Kosovo abstained from 
the violence.^ Many of the demonstrators, between ten and 
twenty thousand, were armed. In the ensuing clashes with 
the riot police, perhaps as many as 2,600 persons were 
killed, many by firearms.50
The revolutionary overtones of the Albanian riots were 
unmistakable. Rioters demanded either republican status for 
Kosovo or outright secession.51 In the official viewpoint, 
these demands amounted to the same thing. The Yugoslav 
regime rushed in tanks and armored personnel carriers, 
imposed a curfew throughout the province, cut off telephone 
connections with the rest of Yugoslavia, and established 
control points on all roads into Prishtina. Commandos and 
soldiers armed with machine guns moved in to patrol the
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streets, and helicopters hovered overhead.52 Some two dozen 
ringleaders were jailed immediately, and a state of 
emergency was declared. On April 5, Prishtina's factories 
were reopened, though a ban on public meetings remained in 
effect.
But pacification failed, as local Albanians continued 
to scrawl anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav graffiti on public 
walls, to distribute insurrectionary pamphlets, and to 
disrupt instruction in public schools. Trains were 
derailed, and the power station at Kosovo Polje and numerous 
other installations and buildings suffered varying degrees 
of damage in a rash of unexplained fires.53 Eventually, the 
schools, closed once and reopened two weeks later, were 
closed for a second time, and the school year was declared 
over.54 The Belgrade media openly asked why the University 
of Prishtina had been encouraged to grow so large, when it 
was inconceivable its graduates could find jobs commensurate 
with their training and ambitions, and when most of the 
students were only fluent in Albanian and not Serbo- 
Croatian. 55
By the end of May 1981, unrest had spread to Montenegro 
and Macedonia, although Albanian activity was generally 
restricted to the distribution of insurrectionary and 
irredentist literature, writing revolutionary slogans in 
public places, and engaging in various acts of desecration. 
Even Serbia had problems, with Albanian nationalists 
stirring up trouble in communes throughout Southern Serbia.
91
Albanians also created disorder in Zagreb, while in the 
Slovenian capital of Ljubljana police were able to abort a 
demonstration of Albanians only at the last minute.^8
Arson, terrorism, sabotage, and pamphleteering became a 
way of life in Kosovo. There were some 680 fires attributed 
to arson during 1980 and 1981. Violent student 
demonstrations continued to break out thorough 1982.
Hundreds of students clashed with security police in 
February and March 1982 riots, leaving numerous injured. 
Three bombs were set off in downtown Prishtina between 
October and November 1982, the third exploding in the 
vicinity of the headquarters of the LCK. As 1982 drew to a 
close, the situation had deteriorated into an uneasy state 
of martial law, with the authorities unable to guarantee 
public safety or the security of property.^
A state of siege prevailed in Kosovo, as 30,000 troops 
and police (most of them from Croatia and Slovenia) 
patrolled the province as an occupation force. All incoming 
and outgoing traffic was scrupulously checked, and the 
movement of outsiders into the province was largely 
proscribed.58 Belgrade hastened to ban textbooks imported 
from Albania, which were discovered to have insurrectionary 
overtones, and undertook to translate the more "reliable" 
Serbian textbooks into Albanian for the use of the 
Kosovars.
The ranks of the party were also infected by 
nationalism, and by July 1982 some 1,000 LCK members were
expelled from the party (including the Albanian provincial 
party chief). Some of the expelled party members were also 
guilty of being participants in the riots. Several basic 
organizations of the LCK were simply dissolved outright. By
i
May 1983, more than 1,100 Albanians had been imprisoned for 
anti-Yugoslav activity, often with fifteen-year sentences. 
The LCY central committee purged the Kosovan party of six of 
the nineteen members of the provincial presidium.®® In 
addition, editors of the radio and television station in 
Prishtina were fired, as were more than two hundred faculty 
members at the University of Prishtina.®1
Party spokesmen also began to express misgivings about 
the radical devolution of authority to the autonomous 
provinces, arguing the provinces should coordinate their 
policies more closely with the Serbian republic.®^ But 
members of the Voyvodinan party vented strong opposition to 
suggestions the prerogatives of the autonomous provinces be 
curtailed.®'*
The 1981 Kosovo riots were a rude awakening as they 
signified the repudiation of more than ten years of intense 
efforts to accelerate development in this backward region. 
They demonstrated the primacy of the ethnic community.®^
The rioters and all who sympathized with them showed a 
preference to live under Albanian despotism rather than to 
remain part of Yugoslavia, however more relatively open the 
latter might be.®® CLearly, it was this separatist and 
irredentist dimension, as well as the possible impact the
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outbreak might have on other discontented nationalities, 
which troubled Belgrade most.
The incipient revolt in Kosovo had driven additional 
Kosovan Montenegrins and Serbs out of Kosovo, precipitated a 
nationalist backlash among Macedonians and Serbs, and 
sparked the proliferation of nationalist excesses throughout 
the other seven federal units.66 Some 10,000 Serbs and 
Montenegrins left Kosovo between April and the end of 
October 1981. Most of them fled to Serbia, often to 
Belgrade, bearing tales of Albanian atrocities which 
reminded many of the Croatian Ustashe in World War II.
The Kosovo Crisis sent tremors through the Tito-less 
LCY hierarchy. At first the regime awkwardly tried to play 
down the riots and attempted to persuade the public the 
riots amounted to no more than the work of traitors, whose 
actions were "unanimously condemned" even by the local 
Albanians. This transparent facade could not be maintained 
for long and the admission of the scale of violence led to 
immediate criticism of the entire LCY policy towards 
Kosovo.67 However, aside from purging Kosovan officials who 
had compromised themselves., the LCY had no new ideas to 
bring to bear. If a policy is considered to be a failure, 
it would appear the regime can only fall back on naked 
force. In fact, Yugoslav police organs have attempted to 
exploit the crisis in order to push through certain 
repressive measures and tighten the political screws.
The prolonged disquiet in Kosovo disproves the Yugoslav 
claim that a unique formula for interethnic harmony has been 
found. The crisis also worked against party liberals. 
Insofar as the central party leadership had discovered that 
the directives issued to the Kosovan party were not being 
carried out, the conclusion can be readily drawn that the 
party was in revolt, and the devolution favored by liberals 
as a means of ethnic appeasement can be turned around and 
exploited as a tool of r e b e l l i o n . T h u s ,  the Kosovo Crisis 
has thrown the whole Yugoslav system off balance. It has 
also dramatically strengthened the position of those in the 
LCY who fear devolution and decentralization have gone too 
far and favor a more literal application of the principle of 
democratic centralism.
The Kosovo Crisis also constitutes an indictment of 
Yugoslav-Marxism itself. The LCY has continued to operate 
on the Marxist-Leninist premise that nationalism under 
socialism is merely an epiphenomenon of economic 
inequalities; and it has, therefore, been pumping large 
amounts of credits into Kosovo. Yet, despite incontestable 
economic gains in absolute terms, Kosovo has steadily 
slipped further behind relative to the other federal 
u n i t s . I n  the case of Kosovo, the policy of economic 
leveling has been a failure in a much more critical sense. 
Since Albanian nationalism is obviously more than 
politicized resentment at economic inequality, the LCY's 
policies are misguided.
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It could be argued that prompt concession of the 
nationalist's minimum demand— creation of an Albanian 
socialist republic within the Yugoslav federation, to 
include not only all of Kosovo but also areas of Montenegro 
and Macedonia inhabited by Albanians— could avert further 
turmoil and defuse backing for the maximum demand.70 Of 
course, the maximum demand constitutes secession of Kosovo 
and those parts of the two neighboring republics and their 
annexation to Albania. However, the sheer violence and 
depth of ethnocentrism spreading throughout Kosovo suggests 
it is too late to consider the minimum demands.
Recently, the few Serbs and Montenegrins left in Kosovo 
have started to become more demonstrative in their protests 
against the Albanian majority. On April 24, 1987, police 
briefly clashed with about 10,000 people and used truncheons 
to control a crowd. The incident occurred when thousands of 
Serbs and Montenegrins gathered outside the Hall of Culture 
in Kosovo Polje. Slobodan Milosevich, the head of the LCS, 
was listening to complaints about alleged harassment of 
minorities by Albanians. About 300 delegates from the crowd 
were admitted to the hall to talk to Milosevich. The clash 
began when the police (comprised primarily of Kosovan 
Albanians)71 tried to disperse the crowd away from the 
hall.72
Although Albanian, Croatian, and Muslim nationalism 
have all proved destabilizing to the Yugoslav system, 
Albanian nationalism differs in one fundamental respect from
the Croatian and Muslim examples. Kosovo lies astride an 
independent Albania which, despite its despotic 
backwardness, exerts an undiminished attraction for Kosovo's 
Albanians.73 Enver Hoxha's demise has failed to reduce the 
level of irredentist sentiment.7^ For this reason, more 
than any other, the question of Albanian nationalism remains 
today the most trying and most intractable problem on 
Belgrade's agenda.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Tito's actions which ended the Croatian crisis and 
swept the liberals out of office affected interrepublican 
relations in an important way. Tito refused to scuttle the 
liberal reforms; yet he did not trust the liberals to 
administer them. He let the conservative factions carry out 
the liberal's vision, thus confirming the quasi-confederal 
nature of the system, without allowing autonomous centers of 
power to become foci of politicized collective activity. 
Ultimately, Tito hoped to hold together a "liberal" system 
not by force but by a common ideology, the ideology of 
"conservatism." In the wake of Tito's death, the LCY, shorn 
of the arbiter who had kept rival factions in check, proved 
unable to agree on a common policy. The LCY's control 
slackened as ethnonationalism inspired republican parties to 
take advantage of growing confederalism.
Yet it is a testament to their political savvy that 
Yugoslav policy-makers did not permit the Croatian crises to 
deflect them from what was the only route which might 
conceivably lead to real stability— that of devolution and 
decentralization.1 Nationalism is both an integrative and 
disintegrative force, and only a polycentric structure is 
apt to have any chance of long term success in a multiethnic 
system.
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Therefore, the Yugoslavs are quite justified in 
claiming they have created a federalism which is virtually 
unique in form. Possibly the most distinctive aspect of 
Yugoslav federalism is the principle of unanimity in 
decision-making in party and governmental organs. Since 
1970, no decision at the federal level has been taken until 
all the federal units acquiesce. Other elements of style 
include the practices of inter republican mutual 
consultation, the pooling of information, the principle of 
proportionality, and the reliance on compromises and 
reciprocal concessions.2
The Yugoslavs make a further claim. They argue that if 
they have not solved the problems attendant to a multiethnic 
polity, at least they have set the ship of state on course 
by virtue of their radical federalism and a profound 
ideological reexamination characterized by original thought 
and innovative reconceptualization.When confronted by 
manifestations of ethnocentrism and ethnic hatred in 
Yugoslavia, regime apologists brush aside these criticisms 
with the observation that the Yugoslav system has resolved 
the national question in essence and form. Thus, Marxism 
beats a hasty retreat from the world of real politics and 
material conflict to the ethereal, idealist realm of 
essences and forms. But the mood at the Twelfth Party 
Congress in June 1982 was sober and "realistic." This 
atmosphere prevailed because of the widespread "suspicion" 
throughout the LCY that federalism is irrelevant to the
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Kosovo problem, that federalism (or even devolution to 
confederalism) cannot solve the "national question," and 
perhaps the Yugoslav national question is ultimately 
"insoluble.
Therefore, this study illustrates what Marxists did not 
anticipate, but what the Yugoslavs have discovered. 
Decentralization and devolution in a Marxist-Leninist 
multinational state is inevitable if there is no 
ethnonational group which wields a majority of power. Even 
more unanticipated, under conditions prevailing in 
Yugoslavia today, The Union of South Slavs has developed 
into a structure which resembles an international balance of 
power system.
Yugoslavia: A Balance of Power System?
Interrepublican relations in contemporary Yugoslavia 
are characterized by flexible coalitions which are primarily 
motivated by ethnonational concerns. The political behavior 
of these federal units closely approximates the behavior of 
states in an international balance of power system. In a 
domestic, just as in an international balance of power 
system, one cannot expect component actors to be moved by 
exhortations to the good of the community. Each group will 
attempt to pursue its interests by subordinating the common 
good to its own communal interests and also by subordinating 
the good of other communal groups to the good of the whole. 
However, an element of restraint is built into such a
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system; the overall survival of the system serves the 
interest of each actor (except, perhaps, in the case of 
Kosovo).5
A requirement for the stability of the system is that 
no single actor (Serbia in the interwar period and up to the 
time of the Croatian Crisis) is indispensible to the 
formation of a winning coalition, and cannot therefore 
impose its will on the decision-making process. Such a 
condition prevails in Yugoslavia today. Thus, policy 
outcomes in matters of interrepublican importance have come 
to depend on the free combination of republican actors in 
shifting alliances and flexible coalitions.
It is possible that most common historical pattern,. 
both among and within states, is the loose bipolar system. 
This system generally presumes two permanently hostile core 
powers, around which lesser powers cluster in a non-random 
fashion which approximates equal distribution of allies. 
Within a multi-national state, this configuration results if 
ethnic groups are polarized on salient and durable issues, 
and if these groups divide into two fairly stable camps; or, 
in a state constituted by a number of regional ethnic units, 
if two predominant units command the allegiance of various 
smaller units. The critical axes along which an ethnically 
diverse state may polarize include religion, alphabet, and 
language.
Therefore, when a society is riddled with reinforced 
cleavages (as in Yugoslavia, where the prosperous, Catholic,
106
ex-Habsburg, Latin-alphabet, industrialized north vies with 
the underdeveloped, Orthodox and Muslim, ex-Ottoman, 
Cyrillic-alphabet south) and when one actor (Serbia in the 
interwar period) attempts to spread its language and culture 
to the rest of the society, a bipolar configuration is a 
natural result.
According to Morton Kaplan, the bipolar system is 
characterized by polarization, with most significant actors 
adhering to one of the two blocs and a universal actor 
presiding over the inevitable conflicts of interest. He 
argues that neither bloc can permit its rival to achieve 
preponderant strength; that each bloc seeks to further its 
own interests first, but will support the universal actor 
(the central government) when such support will help to 
weaken or constrain the rival; and that the universal actor 
will seek, through mediation and whatever coercive 
capability it possesses, to resolve or dampen interbloc 
conflicts and to assuage differences between the blocs.6 If 
unchecked, Kaplan asserts the universal actor will strive to 
impose a directive, monolithic unity on the system.
Kaplan's bipolar description was meant to elucidate the 
processes of the Cold War system, with the United Nations in 
the role of the universal actor. However, bipolar politics 
in no way presumes, a priori, the presence of a universal 
actor. Yet, at the same time, Kaplan intended his model to 
have a degree of universality which would transcend mere 
description of U.S.-Soviet competition. The LCY,
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headquartered in Belgrade, functions as a kind of universal 
actor within the Yugoslav system. But, unlike the U.N., 
which can always be paralyzed by veto, the central party of 
Yugoslavia has retained considerable powers, even during the 
devolutionary days of the Croatian crisis.
Between 1918 and 1941, and again from 1945 to 1965, 
Yugoslavia functioned as a loose bipolar system. Interwar 
Yugoslav politics was monopolized by the Serbs and Croats. 
Their electoral aspirations were championed, respectively, 
by the Serbian Radical party, under Nikola Pasich, and the 
Croatian Peasant party (CPP), led by Stjepan Radich. The 
government, though not a Serbian creation, was dominated by 
the Serbs, who staffed the new government with the leaders 
of the old Serbian pre-World War I kingdom. The Serbs 
denied the national identity of the Macedonians and 
Montenegrins, viewed Croats and Slovenes as no more than 
regional "tribes" of the Serbian nation, and attempted to 
run the state on a unitary basis.^
As early as 1919, Radich supported Croatian secession. 
The Croatian question lay at the heart of the constitutional 
debate, and Croatian politicians exerted pressure in 
Belgrade to make some accommodations.® Toward the end of 
1924, pressured by the CPP, Nikola Pasich, the Serbian prime 
minister, briefly entertained the possibility of cutting off 
Croatia and permitting the CPP to establish an independent 
republic there. However, the imposition of royal 
dictatorship in 1929 (along with the flight to Italy by Ante
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Pavelich and a group of militant Croats organized into the 
fascist Ustashe party) was symptomatic of the increasing 
bifurcation of Yugoslav politics into centralists (Serbs) 
and decentralists (Croats).^ Tragically, by 1934 even 
Yugoslavia's King Alexander was convinced of the 
untenability of the political status quo, and may have been 
planning to divide Yugoslavia into a Serbian unit and a 
Croatian unit when an Ustashe assassin cut him down.1®
In the immediate postwar period, after the 
reconstitution of a unified Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito, 
the state authorities revived the centralist solution and 
resumed the attempt to forge a Yugoslav identity, albeit one 
which was meant to transcend mere Serbian ethnic identity.11 
Belgrade aspired to "reduce the incompatibility between 
blocs."1'* As a result, by the 1960s the picture had become 
quite different from what it had been in the interwar years. 
Previously unacknowledged groups such as Macedonians, 
Bosnians, and the Albanians of Kosovo were granted de jure 
recognition and, with it, some institutional instruments for 
ethnic interest articulation. Yet despite these changes, 
the system remained bipolar. Croatia and Serbia remained 
the major actors in the system until the advent of the 
Croatian Crisis, which brought balance of power interethnic 
politics to Yugoslavia.
The fundamental principle of balance of power politics 
is that no single actor has sufficient power to dictate 
terms unilaterally to the other actors. In Kaplan's version
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of the balance of power system, there is no universal or 
supranational actor capable of marshaling authoritative 
legitimacy (the U.N. does so only occasionally),1  ̂ winning 
elite consensus (as did Metternich's Concert of Europe),14 
or effectively utilizing armed force (the U.N. in Korea).
Any national actor which strives to transform itself into a 
supranational actor by attempting to launch an incipient 
world state (Napoleon I) is opposed by those capable of 
resistance.16 In addition, Hans J. Morgenthau argues that 
the balance of power model can also be divided into two main 
patterns, a pattern of direct opposition between actors 
(Serbia and Croatia) and one of competition (Slovenia and 
Croatia) among them.16
Therefore, Yugoslavia's road to balance of power 
politics lay in the rise of political consciousness in 
federal units other than Serbia and Croatia, and in the 
massive devolution of power to the republics during the late 
1960s. This devolution enabled republics other than Serbia 
and Croatia to wield autonomous power in the political 
arena.
The following discussion, which recapitulates the 
fluidity of interrepublican alliances during the Croatian 
Crisis, should serve to illustrate balance of power behavior 
in Yugoslav politics. During the Croatian Crisis, Croat 
leaders concentrated on decentralization of the party.
Backed by the Slovenes and the Macedonians, the Croats kept 
momentum on their side. The Ninth Party Congress registered
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the victory of the Croatian-led nationalist-liberal 
coalition by devolving appreciable power to the republican 
parties. The nationalist-liberal coalition was based on 
premises of common interest and mutual trust. These 
evaporated after 1969, as the Croatian party (along with 
pressure from Matica Hrvatska) went beyond the desires of 
its coalition partners.17 Having lent Croatia support 
against Serbia in previous confrontations, Voyvodina, 
Slovenia, and Macedonia backed away from an alliance with 
Croatia. However, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar 
allowed their supporters to push them further to the 
political right toward ever more radical, nationalist 
positions. Tripalo and Dabchevich-Kuchar were unable to 
dissociate themselves from their more radical followers, who 
demanded Croatia's secession and even aggrandizement of 
Croatian territory at the expense of other republics. 
Defusing the Croatian Crisis entailed the removal of Tripalo 
and Dabchevich-Kuchar and the bridling of Croatia's radical 
students.
In conclusion, the balance of power model predicts that 
an actor who goes too far and whose ambitions threaten the 
territorial integrity of the other members of the system 
will be isolated and brought to heel. The Croatian Crisis 
of 1971 confirms this principle. Moreover, in this crisis, 
as in LCY debate over the Muslim question and the Kosovo 
Crisis, the federal units displayed autonomy, flexibility, 
and the power to affect federal policy. Therefore,
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analyzing Yugoslavia as a balance of power system is a 
useful, and perhaps necessary, conceptual construct for 
interpreting Yugoslav politics since 1965.
However, it must be conceded that Yugoslavia is a 
unique laboratory for observing political behavior in a 
Marxist-Leninist multinational state, one which does not 
contain a majority ethnic group within the population. 
Perhaps, the thesis of this study will be thoroughly tested 
when the Soviet Union experiences what is evidently an 
inevitable demographic shift, one which is inexorably 
eroding the dominance of the Greater Russian majority in the 
Soviet political system.
The U.S.S.R.'s dilemma can be anticipated in Soviet 
Central Asia. In December 1986, several hundred students in 
Alma Ata, capital of the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, 
demonstrated violently after a Russian replaced an ethnic 
Kazak as the republic's party leader. The situation was 
serious enough to warrant the use of Soviet troops to keep 
order.1® The analogy to Kosovo is rather obvious. The 
populations of the Soviet Union's Asian republics are 
predominantly Muslim, and their population growth far 
outstrips that of the Greater Russians. Thus, it is 
conceivably only a matter of time before the U.S.S.R. has to 
confront a situation which is not too dissimilar from the 
quandary the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia encountered and 
the LCY now faces.1®
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Perspectives
To present Yugoslavia as a balance of power system is 
neither to deny the reality of the deterioration of 
interethnic relations in the mid-1960s nor to assume the 
antipathy which has characterized interethnic relations is a 
permanent feature of the system. However, it is not merely 
because of Yugoslavia's ethnic divisions that the federal 
system operates as a balance of power system. Yet, it is 
undeniable that ethnicity and nationalism are the primary 
factors which influence the choice of alliance partners and 
the endurance of coalitions.
Milovan Djilas wrote that, "by 2024 Yugoslavia will 
become a confederation of four states: Slovenia, Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Serbia, with Serbia itself being a federative 
s t a t e . D j i l a s '  four emergent states were all expected to 
evolve from the present socialist republics. But there is 
not only an institutional prediction to his prognostica­
tions, there is also an ethnic dimension. Djilas predicted 
both Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina would disappear as 
autonomous territories— the former because of the close 
ethnic affinity between Serbs and Montenegrins, and the 
latter, perhaps, because Muslim self-consciousness is 
neither so developed nor so tenacious as Serbian, Croatian, 
or Slovene nationalism.
However, neither in interstate politics nor in the 
study of multinational states can external actors be 
ignored. The Soviet Union, as Yugoslavia is fully aware,
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would welcome an opportunity to establish a hegemonic hold 
over Yugoslavia. Belgrade continues to fear the Kremlin 
might, under certain circumstances, allow its proxy, 
Bulgaria, to annex all or part of Macedonia.21
Therefore, Yugoslavia's overall rating for political 
performance would have to be considered a solid medium.
This is considerably less that its apologists would have the 
world believe, but it is commendable in a country with four 
major languages and large differences in levels of 
development. Whether Yugoslavia will improve as a system 
depends chiefly on two factors: its ability to transform 
itself into a fully legitimate regime (which might require 
the abandonment of the one-party system)22 and the federal 
government's ability to recruit in Tito's words, "men from 
the republics who are not republicans."22 Tito's appeal 
suggests a need for system transformation. But Yugoslavia's 
present political configuration may not be capable of 
achieving more than a medium rating for political 
performance.2^ It is thus conceivable that the Yugoslav, 
system has reached the limit of its potential for conflict
t.
accommodation. "Someday,", writes Milovan Djilas, "the lid
may blow off."22
Perhaps the noted Marxist philosopher, Tom Nairn, best
characterized Marxism's deficiencies when challenged by the
Hegelian, non-material, and semimystic elements of modern
nationalism:
The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's 
great historical failure. It may have had others
as well ... Marxism's shortcomings over 
imperialism, the State, the falling rate of profit 
and the immiseration of the masses are certainly 
old battlefields. Yet none of these is as 
important, as fundamental, as the problem of 
nationalism, either in theory or in political 
practice. It is true that other traditions of 
western thought have not done better. Idealism, 
German historicism, liberalism, social Darwinism 
and modern sociology have foundered as badly as 
Marxism here. This is cool comfort for Marxists. 
The scientific pretensions and the political 
significance of their ideas are greater than those 
of such rivals, and no one can help feeling that, 
they ought to have coped better with such a 
central, inescapable phenomenon of modern 
history.26
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